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Jews in the UK today

Key findings from the JPR National Jewish Identity Survey

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The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)** is a London-based research organisation, consultancy and think-tank. It aims to advance the prospects of Jewish communities in the United Kingdom and across Europe by conducting research and informing policy development in dialogue with those best placed to positively influence Jewish life.

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/ Introduction and acknowledgements

There are about 300,000 Jews living in the UK today – a small number compared to the 7 million in Israel and 6 million in the United States – and a tiny minority in Britain, comprising less than half a percent of the population of the country as a whole. At the same time, the UK is home to the fifth largest Jewish population in the world, and the capital city, London, houses the fourteenth largest urban Jewish population globally, second only to Paris in terms of cities outside of Israel and the US.

So our perceptions of size are relative. The British Jewish community is both large and small – large enough to have built a vibrant and dynamic Jewish life in the country with numerous synagogues, Jewish schools, youth movements, cultural centres, festivals and events, but small enough to see many regional communities struggling to maintain their infrastructure, and for individual Jews to sometimes feel vulnerable and isolated in the face of an antisemitic threat that appears to be growing. British Jews continue to grapple with the tension between being out and proud in multicultural Britain, and toning down or hiding their Jewishness for fear of standing out or falling victim to hostility. In that regard, they remain insiders/outsideers – feeling part of modern Britain and acculturated into wider British life, yet also exposed, or not fully seen or understood.

At the same time, when one scratches beneath the surface of the Jewish population, one quickly finds tremendous diversity. At one end of the spectrum, there is the rapidly growing *haredi*, or strictly Orthodox community, living intensely religious Jewish lives informed by unerring belief in God and extensive study of Jewish religious texts. At the other, there is a large proportion of self-identifying Jews who are completely secular, rarely, if ever, setting foot in a synagogue, but nonetheless finding significant meaning and pride in some of the cultural aspects of Jewish life and history. And in between these poles are numerous shades of Jewishness; Jews seeking to strike their own preferred balance between their Jewish and British identities, their spiritual and rational beliefs, and their commitments to the community and the wider world.

This report delves into all of this. The findings are based on JPR's 2022 National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS), a landmark study designed to paint a comprehensive portrait of how Jews in the UK understand, express, and practise their Jewishness today. It explores multiple issues, including belief in God, engagement in synagogue and wider community life, Jewish practices on Shabbat and festivals, Jewish educational and cultural participation and consumption, and charitable giving and volunteering. It investigates Jewish people's attachments to Israel and their experiences of antisemitism, how accepted they feel by the wider Jewish community, and the strength of both their Jewish and British identities. And it does all of this through multiple lenses, seeking to understand distinctions between Jews by the strength of their religiosity, their denominational stream, age, sex, educational background, political preferences and many other variables. In doing so, it presents the most comprehensive portrait of Jews in the UK we have ever painted, providing a uniquely detailed view of who British Jews are today.

Fieldwork for the survey took place in November and December 2022, and was conducted among Jews aged 16 or above, living in the UK. Respondents could self-identify as Jewish on any basis – for example, by religion, ethnicity, culture, parentage or heritage – so the sample contains a broad cross-section of Jews. The vast majority of respondents completed the questionnaire online, which was designed in many respects to replicate the one used in JPR’s 2013 National Jewish Community Survey (NJCS); one of the goals was to assess how, if at all, Jewish identity has changed over the course of the past decade. The final sample contains responses from 4,891 participants, of whom about two-thirds had signed up to the JPR Research Panel during previous surveys; the remainder were new recruits. The sample was adjusted using weights from UK census data and Jewish community data on synagogue membership, to ensure that it closely resembles the known sociodemographic characteristics of the UK Jewish population. Full details can be found in the methodology section at the end of the report.

As with all of JPR’s work, the report is primarily aimed at those working to shape Jewish life positively in the years to come. JPR exists to generate data to support Jewish community planning, so the findings here should be of particular value to lay and professional Jewish leaders, the numerous staff working in Jewish charities across the country, and community donors thinking about how best to invest their charitable funds in Jewish life. It will also be helpful to individuals working in government, politics and journalism – those seeking to understand and support the Jewish community from the outside, or to write or report about it in the media. In constructing the questionnaire, conducting the study, analysing the results and writing up the findings, we have also been conscious of our more academic audience – sociologists of religion, ethnicity and identity more generally, for whom these results form part of a much wider canon of literature on these topics. And without wishing to overstate the importance of the report, we also have an eye on history: in the future, we hope that these findings will offer historians of Jews in the UK a valuable and important account of Jewish life and identity in the early part of the twenty-first century; a reference point to understand who British Jews were at this point in time.

It is important to note that the data for this study were collected several months before the barbaric attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023, but the report is being published after that. That event, and the war it has prompted, loom very large at the time of writing – Jews around the world, including here in the UK, are reeling both from the sheer scale and brutality of the assault and from public reaction to it, which has included a significant spike in recorded antisemitic incidents. It is distinctly possible that people’s Jewish identities will have shifted somewhat in response, perhaps particularly on variables related to Israel and antisemitism, although it is equally possible that any such changes will be temporary; one of the more striking aspects of the findings here is that many attitudes and behaviours appear to have shifted little over the past decade. Time will tell, and this report will provide a very important baseline against which to make future assessments.

I am grateful to many people who helped to make this report possible. First and foremost, I want to acknowledge some of the key donors to JPR, whose unrestricted funding for our work is so fundamental to our success. In particular, the teams at Pears Foundation, the Rothschild Foundation Hanadiv Europe and the Wohl Legacy have invested in JPR’s work over many years, and they play a critical role in ensuring that we have the capacity and expertise to do all of our work, and to share it with community leaders and

policymakers to support their planning efforts. The support of other major foundations and organisations – the David and Ruth Lewis Charitable Trust, the Bloom Foundation, the Charles Wolfson Charitable Trust, the Haskel Foundation, the Kirsh Foundation, the Davis Foundation, the Jewish Leadership Council, the Morris Leigh Foundation, the Maurice Hatter Foundation, the Exilarch Foundation, the Humanitarian Trust, the Sobell Foundation and Elizabeth and Ashley Mitchell – has also played an important role in enabling us to develop the research methods and infrastructure that underpins this and other survey exercises. I am immensely appreciative of all of them for their confidence and support. The donations of many other trusts and foundations, as well as individual donors contributing in a personal capacity, have also been used for this purpose, and I am grateful to them all. Choosing to invest in this type of work often requires donors to think beyond their specific interests and concerns, and to recognise that all community organisations need fundamental data to help them understand their constituencies and plan for the future. Without exception, the pool of donors who invest in JPR see this very clearly, and back it up with their financial support. The Jewish community as a whole owes them a huge debt of gratitude – without data, all the community would have to work with would be opinions and anecdotes.

I also want to thank the wider team at JPR. All of our trustees, led by our Chairman, Stephen Moss CBE, our Vice Chairman, David Ereira, and President, Lord Leigh of Hurley, give up countless hours of their free time to help us to achieve our goals. As well as providing wise and thoughtful counsel on a wide range of issues, they regularly put their hands in their own pockets to support our work. The staff, whether working in research, operations, administration, fundraising or communications, have all played valuable roles in this study. I particularly want to express my deepest gratitude to my colleagues, Dr David Graham, for his highly detailed and comprehensive expert analysis of the data, and Dr Carli Lessof, for her extensive work building and running the survey, and managing many of the methodological issues. Thanks, too, to Dr Isabel Sawkins for her support with the questionnaire, for programming the survey and recruiting new respondents; to Omri Gal for his marketing and campaigning work designed to maximise levels of response among hard-to-reach groups; Dr Daniel Staetsky, for providing methodological input and advice and for reviewing this report and sharing his typically astute and insightful feedback; and Richard Goldstein, for his general support and encouragement in many of these tasks. Gratitude is due too to Judith Russell, for her editorial work, and to the team at Soapbox, who have carefully designed this report to ensure that it is readable and accessible. It takes a tremendous amount of time, expertise and dedication to put together a study of this kind, and I count myself extremely fortunate to work with such committed and accomplished people.

The future strength and vitality of the UK Jewish community matter deeply, not only to the community itself, but also, I believe, to the country as a whole. The ability of Jews to live their Jewish lives freely, without fear of hostility or attack, and to function as a community able not simply to survive, but to thrive, says a great deal about the state of Britain today. In a free and democratic society, ethnic and religious minorities should be able to express their identities as they wish, as long as doing so does not prevent others from doing likewise. It can be difficult sometimes to find an appropriate balance between expressing one's particular identity freely whilst also being part of wider society, and in many respects, this report explores the extent to which Jews in the UK today feel able to do so. Readers will inevitably draw their own conclusions as to whether the picture painted here is positive or negative; in truth, it is probably a bit of both.

But critically, the purpose of the study is not to pass judgement, but rather to pause and reflect, and to use the data to help build a Jewish community in the UK that is both a credit to itself, and to the country of which it is part.

Dr Jonathan Boyd
Executive Director

/ Summary of key findings

The 2022 National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS) was carried out between 16 November and 23 December 2022. The final sample size was 4,891 self-identifying Jewish people aged 16 and above and living in the UK.

Key topics

God and the Torah

- 47% of Jews consider the Torah to be a human creation; just 18% believe that it is the actual word of God.
- 25% do not believe in God; the remainder are believers, but are more likely to believe in some kind of 'higher power or spiritual force' (41%) than to believe in God 'as described in the Bible' (34%).
- British Jews are as likely as British society as a whole to believe in God, but are considerably less likely to be ardently secular.
- Less than half of synagogue members (44%) believe in God as described in the Bible and only a quarter (26%) believe that the Torah is the actual word of God.
- Belief in God is more likely among Jews who do not have a degree, are less well-off and/or support the Conservative Party.
- Over two-thirds (69%) of British Jews do not think that belief in God is central to being a good Jew. Yet 42% do not believe the universe came about by chance and 46% believe that praying to God can help overcome personal problems.

Jewish denominational streams

- The proportions of Jews who self-identify as Haredi or Orthodox (19%), Reform or Progressive (18%), and non-practising (i.e. secular or cultural) (19%) are very similar; a further 27% self-identifies as 'Traditional'.
- Reform/Progressive Jews are considerably more likely to be female (59%) than Traditional, Orthodox or Haredi Jews (45%-47%).
- Haredi Jews are most likely to be aged under 40 (56%) and Traditional Jews are least likely to be in that age band (22%).
- Jews self-identifying as 'Traditional' are twice as likely as Reform/Progressive Jews to say that more than half of their friends are Jewish (80% to 41%).

Religious switching

- About six in ten of all Jews who grew up either Orthodox, Traditional or Reform/Progressive, continue to identify with the denominational groups in which they were brought up; about one in ten in each group has moved religiously 'rightwards' over time (i.e. to more traditional or orthodox positions), and three in ten have moved religiously 'leftwards' (i.e. towards more liberal or secular positions).
- Irrespective of the denomination in which they were brought up, younger people (aged 16–29) are the most likely age group to report having moved religiously 'leftwards'.
- Nevertheless, looking at the Jewish population as a whole, over the past decade there have been small increases in the proportions identifying as Haredi, Reform/Progressive and Traditional, and a significant decline in the proportion identifying as non-practising (secular/cultural).

Markers of Jewish identity

- British Jews are most likely to say that remembering the Holocaust, combating antisemitism, feeling part of the Jewish People and strong moral and ethical behaviour are the most important aspects of how they see themselves Jewishly; they are least likely to point to studying religious texts, prayer, keeping kosher or socialising in predominantly Jewish groups.
- Remembering the Holocaust and combating antisemitism have become noticeably more important to British Jews over the past decade, along with feeling part of the Jewish People and sharing Jewish festivals with the family.
- Of the 18 identity markers presented, Jewish men were more likely than Jewish women to prioritise religious items (e.g. belief in God and prayer), whereas Jewish women were more likely to prioritise Jewish socio-cultural items (e.g. family, culture, ethical behaviour).
- On 14 of these identity markers, the more religious a person says they are, the more likely it is they will strongly identify with them. Only on 4 of the 18 markers is this not the case: combating antisemitism, Jewish culture (Jewish music, literature, art), remembering the Holocaust and supporting social justice causes.

Synagogue life

- 57% of British Jewish adults belong to a synagogue. The older people are, the more likely they are to belong to one – just 28% of those in their twenties and 40% of those in their thirties belong.
- The better people's economic circumstances are, the more likely they are to belong to a synagogue.
- Over a third of all synagogue members (37%) do not believe in God.
- 27% of British Jews currently attend synagogue on most Sabbaths or more often. The identical proportion never attends synagogue. 15% attend only on the High Holy Days of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur.

- Attendance levels at synagogue have remained largely steady over the past decade. The most common reason given for attending is 'because I feel a sense of belonging'.
- Men are notably more likely than women to attend synagogue services monthly or more often (49% compared to 33%).
- The least likely age bands to attend synagogue monthly or more often are those in their twenties and thirties and those aged 80 and above.
- Married Jews are close to twice as likely as those who have never been married to attend synagogue monthly or more often.
- Of those who attend synagogue infrequently or not at all (59% of the whole), one in six say the reason for not doing so is that they don't think they know enough to participate.

Jewish community engagement, attachment and acceptance

- Engagement levels in community life have declined somewhat since the COVID-19 pandemic. Where 57% reported moderate to high levels of engagement before the pandemic, 50% report these levels now.
- The more religiously observant one is, the more likely they are to report high levels of engagement in Jewish community life.
- 33% say they feel strongly attached and 28% feel moderately attached to their local Jewish community. Feelings of attachment are closely associated with frequency of synagogue attendance.
- Half (49%) of all British Jews say they feel very well accepted by the Jewish community.
- Married Jews are twice as likely to feel strongly attached to, and very well accepted by, the Jewish community, as those who have never been married.
- The younger people are, the less likely they are to say that they feel very well accepted and/or strongly attached to the Jewish community.
- Of the 11% of Jews who do not feel accepted by their local Jewish community, the most common reasons given are their views on Israel/Zionism, their sexual identity/orientation or their having a non-Jewish partner.

Shabbat

- 61% of British Jews attend a Friday night Shabbat meal most weeks; 80% report candles being lit in their homes on Shabbat at least occasionally.
- 20% do not switch on lights and 23% never travel in a car on Shabbat.
- The proportion of Jews who report attending a Friday night Shabbat meal most weeks has increased over the past decade from 54% to 61%

- Jews in their forties and fifties are more likely than all other age groups to attend a Friday night Shabbat meal most weeks.
- Almost all Jews who identify as Orthodox (97%) attend a Friday night meal most weeks, as do 78% of those who identify as Traditional. But while almost all (96%) Orthodox Jews do not use a car on Shabbat, this is the case for just 10% of Traditional Jews.
- 58% of British Jews say they regularly make time for family or friends on Shabbat; 31% take a break from using technology; 29% use the day in part for Jewish learning or reading.

Kashrut (keeping kosher)

- Excluding vegetarians, two in five (40%) Jewish families only buy kosher meat for the home, and 39% separate meat and milk at home.
- These practices are more or less universal among haredi and Orthodox Jewish families, and very common among Traditional ones at a level of around 75%. They are far less common among Reform/Progressive families (about 15%), and almost non-existent among non-practising secular/cultural ones (3%).
- Families experiencing the toughest economic circumstances are notably less likely to buy kosher meat for the home than other families, but there is no such differentiation with regard to the separation of milk and meat at home.
- Two in five (39%) British Jews only eat kosher meat inside and outside the home; a further 11% eat kosher meat at home but not outside.
- Whilst almost no Haredi Jews will eat in a non-kosher restaurant that only serves vegetarian food, half (50%) of those who identify as Orthodox and almost all who identify as Traditional, Reform/Progressive or non-practising secular and cultural Jews will do so.

Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur

- In 2022, 57% of all British Jews attended at least one in-person synagogue service on Rosh Hashana and, separately, 15% participated in one online.
- Three-quarters (74%) of all Jews observed Rosh Hashana rituals (e.g. lighting candles, eating apple and honey) at home.
- Jews in their forties were more likely than any other age band to attend an in-person synagogue service on Rosh Hashana; of all age bands, those aged from their twenties to their forties were most likely to observe rituals at home.
- Six out of ten (59%) non-synagogue members observed Rosh Hashana rituals at home, although far fewer attended a synagogue service in-person (13%) or online (8%).
- 56% of all Jews say they fast on Yom Kippur every year, three-percentage points higher than a decade ago. 13% of Jews do not fast for health reasons and a further 18% never fast – a considerable decline from a decade ago when the equivalent proportion was 26%.

- Jews in their thirties, forties and fifties are most likely to fast every year; both older and younger Jews are less likely to do so.
- Fasting on Yom Kippur for those able to do so is more or less universal among Haredi and Orthodox Jews. Half of all Reform/Progressive Jews fast every year. Almost a quarter (23%) of people who do not belong to a synagogue fast every year.

Pesach (Passover)

- 71% of all British Jews attend a seder every year, with a further 22% attending one most or some years.
- Jews in their forties and fifties are more likely than all other age groups to attend a seder every year.
- Almost two in five (38%) of people who do not belong to a synagogue report attending a seder every year, as do 32% of non-practising secular/cultural Jews.

Chanukah

- 71% of all British Jews participate in at least one Chanukah candle lighting ceremony every year, with a further 21% doing so most or some years.
- Jews in their forties are more likely than all other age groups to light Chanukah candles. Both younger and older Jews are progressively less likely to do this.
- Lighting Chanukah candles every year is more or less universal among Jews self-identifying as Haredi or Orthodox, and very high among those identifying as Traditional (87%) and Reform/Progressive (72%). Close to half (42%) of people who do not belong to a synagogue light Chanukah candles.

Secular commemoration days and holidays

- Over half of all British Jews (54%) mark the general international Holocaust Memorial Day (27 January) in some way, a somewhat higher proportion than those who mark Yom HaShoah, the equivalent Jewish/Israeli commemorative day (42%).
- About one in three (32%) mark Yom Ha'Atzma'ut – Israel Independence Day – and about a quarter (24%) mark Yom HaZikaron, the memorial day for fallen Israeli soldiers and victims of terrorism.
- Two-thirds of all British Jews (67%) mark at least one of these secular days. In general, the more religiously observant are more likely to do so than the less religiously observant, with one striking exception – Haredi Jews – of whom just one in three (34%) does so. Even those who are not members of synagogues are close to twice as likely as Haredi Jews (58% to 34%) to mark at least one of these days in some way.
- The stronger the attachment people feel to Israel, the more likely they are to observe at least one of these days, although about half (52%) of those who say they are not at all attached to Israel still do so.

Christmas

- While Christmas is obviously not a Jewish holiday, 28% of all British Jews say they have a Christmas tree at home, at least some years; 13% have one every year.
- The younger Jews are, the more likely they are to report having a Christmas tree at home, particularly among those aged in their twenties (36%) and thirties (35%).
- More or less no Haredi or Orthodox Jews have a Christmas tree at home, but 8% of Traditional Jews do at least some years, as do two in five (38%) Reform/Progressive Jews, and three in five (58%) of secular/cultural Jews.
- 13% of synagogue members have a Christmas tree at least some years.

Circumcision and Jewish funerals

- 85% of British Jews who have had a son, had him circumcised. Most of these circumcisions occurred under Jewish religious auspices (i.e. by a mohel), but about one in ten did not.
- Circumcision is more or less universal among Jews identifying as Haredi, Orthodox and Traditional, and very common among those identifying as Reform/Progressive (87%) and Just Jewish (84%). A majority (60%) of non-practising (secular/cultural) Jews also follow this practice.
- Almost all Jews wish to have a Jewish funeral when the time comes. This desire is more or less universal among Haredi, Orthodox, Traditional and Reform/Progressive Jews, and very high among those identifying as Just Jewish (88%). Only among non-practising secular/cultural Jews is the attitude different – only about half of this group (49%) say they want a Jewish funeral.

Jewish religious and cultural consumption

- Four in five (79%) British Jews report having bought a challah (kosher plaited loaf) in the past year and over half (53%) report having bought a yahrzeit (memorial) candle in the same period.
- 72% of all British Jews say they have seen a film or television series on a Jewish theme in the past year, and 20% say they have attended a Jewish music event.
- About one in seven (15%) reported going to a Jewish museum in the UK in the previous year, and a similar proportion (12%) reported going to a UK-based Holocaust museum or memorial.
- One third of all British Jews said they had done at least three out of six listed non-religious Jewish cultural activities in the previous year (buying a Jewish book or piece of art, seeing a Jewish film or play, attending a Jewish concert, going to a Jewish museum). Reform/Progressive Jews were most likely to have done so (42%); Haredi Jews were least likely (9%).

Jewish schooling

- Of all British Jews today, one in three (34%) attended a Jewish school at some stage (primary or secondary or both).
- Jewish men are slightly more likely than Jewish women to have attended a Jewish school (37% to 32%).
- Younger people are more likely than their elders to have attended a Jewish school. About half of those aged between 16 and 39 did so, but that proportion declines by age band thereafter to the point where just one in ten (11%) of those aged 80 and above report ever having attended one.
- Those who are strongly attached to the community are more likely to have attended a Jewish school than those who are weakly attached.
- Synagogue members are much more likely than non-synagogue members to have sent at least one of their children to a Jewish school (56% to 15%).
- 45% of Jews with children (of any age) had sent at least one of their children to a Jewish school. The younger Jewish parents are, the more likely it is they have sent/currently send their children to a Jewish school.
- Parents in weaker economic circumstances are more likely to send their children to a Jewish school than those in stronger economic circumstances.

Jewish educational experiences outside the school

- The most commonly observed Jewish educational experience is a bar mitzvah ceremony – 83% of all British Jewish men report having had one. By contrast, only 44% of Jewish women report having had a bat mitzvah.
- While 85% to 90% of males aged from their forties to their eighties had a bar mitzvah ceremony, this is the case for 75% to 80% of males in their twenties and thirties. By contrast, bat mitzvah ceremonies have become more common over time. Just 8% of females in their eighties had a bat mitzvah, compared with 60% aged 16 to 29.
- 58% of all British Jews say they were involved in a Jewish youth club or youth movement, more or less the same proportion (57%) who said they attended part-time classes in a synagogue, religion school or cheder.
- 45% of all British Jews attended a Jewish youth summer camp, and 33% said they went on an Israel summer tour. 41% have been members of a university Jewish society.
- There is a strong positive relationship between the number of these educational items Jews have experienced and the likelihood of their being religiously observant, attached to the Jewish community, in-married, having mostly Jewish friends and feeling attached to Israel.

Adult Jewish education

- Two in five (40%) British Jews report attending a public lecture on a Jewish theme in the year prior to the survey, while over a quarter (27%) attended a Torah lesson, lecture or 'shiur' and 7% attended a Hebrew language class or ulpan.
- About one in five (19%) reported attending a course on Jewish history or culture, more or less the same proportion that reported doing regular independent Torah learning at home (18%).
- Jewish men are more likely than women to do most of these things, except for Hebrew language classes.
- Attending Torah lessons is most likely to be done by Haredi (91%) and Orthodox (76%) Jews. Reform/Progressive Jews are just as likely as Traditional Jews to attend Torah lessons (22%), whereas almost no non-practising secular/cultural Jews do so.

Jewish status and ethnicity

- 83% of all British Jews report that both of their parents are Jewish. 8% have a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father; 4% have a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother.
- 93% report being Jewish by birth; 5% are Jewish by conversion; and 2% report being Jewish 'in another way'.
- Jewish converts are much more likely to be women than men (61% to 39%). 87% converted in the UK. Of these, three out of four did so through either the Reform (46%) or Liberal (29%) movements; 17% underwent conversion under Orthodox auspices.
- 82% of British Jews are of Ashkenazi origin, compared to 5% Sephardi and 9% 'Mixed'.
- The older Jews are, the more likely they are to be Ashkenazi, although 76% of those in their twenties are Ashkenazi. By contrast, the younger Jews are, the more likely they are to be 'Mixed'. The likelihood of being Sephardi is fairly insensitive to age.
- Sephardi Jews are more emotionally attached to Israel than Ashkenazi Jews, and they are also more likely to hold an Israeli passport (11% to 6%). Sephardi Jews are also more likely than Ashkenazim to report stronger levels of religiosity.

Jewishness and Britishness

- British Jews report having stronger Jewish identities (average score out of 10 = 8.3) than British identities (score = 6.9).
- While the strength of Jewish identity is insensitive to age, the younger people are, the weaker their score for British identity (5.9 for those aged 16–29, compared to 7.8 for those aged 60-plus).
- By contrast, the strength of Jewish identity increases with the strength of Jewish religiosity, whereas the strength of British identity is only weakly related to religiosity.

- Those who are most strongly attached to Israel report both the strongest levels of Jewish identity and of British identity. Indeed, the most strongly attached score higher on the British identity scale (7.2) than those who are not at all attached to Israel score on the Jewish identity scale (6.7).
- British Jews who support the Conservative Party score higher on both the Jewish (8.9) and British (8.0) identity scales than supporters of all other major parties. Labour Party supporters still score highly though: 8.0 on the Jewish scale and 6.4 on the British one.

Jewish languages

- 22% of British Jews report speaking Hebrew either fluently or a fair amount. By contrast, just 7% of British Jews say they speak Yiddish fluently or a fair amount.
- Hebrew is most likely to be spoken by those aged in their thirties and forties. The opposite pattern is observed with regard to Yiddish, where it is those in their eighties and those in their twenties who are most likely to speak it.
- Two-thirds (63%) of Haredi Jews speak Hebrew fluently or a fair amount, and over half (53%) do so for Yiddish; fewer than one in five Traditional (17%) and Reform/Progressive (16%) Jews report similar levels for Hebrew, and vanishingly few (2% to 3%) for Yiddish.
- One third (33%) of those who report feeling very attached to Israel speak Hebrew fluently or a fair amount, compared to one in ten (9%) of those who feel no attachment.

Intermarriage

- One-third (34%) of British Jews who got married between 2010 and 2022 married non-Jews. This is up from 24% in the 2000s, and 17% in the 1990s.
- Jewish women are considerably more likely than Jewish men to have a non-Jewish spouse (21% to 14%).
- No Jews identifying as Haredi or Orthodox are intermarried, whereas almost half (48%) of non-practising secular/cultural Jews are.
- Intermarried Jews are far more weakly connected to the Jewish community than in-married Jews. For example, they are less likely to belong to a synagogue, fast on Yom Kippur, donate to Jewish charities or to say half or more of their friends are Jewish.

Zionism, attachment to Israel and *aliyah*

- The proportion of British Jews self-identifying as Zionist fell from 72% in 2013 to 63% in 2022. In 2022, a further 15% identified as non-Zionist, 8% as anti-Zionist, and 14% were unsure or gave another answer.
- British Jews in their fifties are the most likely to self-identify as Zionists (78%); the proportion falls steadily for those in their forties (66%), thirties (61%) and twenties (57%).

- Jews self-identifying as Orthodox (90%) or Traditional (82%) are most likely to identify as Zionist. Haredi Jews are least likely (31%).
- 73% of Jews who support the Conservative Party consider themselves to be Zionist, compared to 59% of Jewish Labour supporters, 62% of Liberal Democrats, and 26% of Greens.
- A large majority (88%) of Jewish adults in Britain have been to Israel. 17% have lived there and a further 71% have visited Israel at least once but not lived there. Just 12% have never visited Israel.
- 73% of British Jews feel either very attached (41%) or somewhat attached (32%) to Israel. 91% of self-identifying Zionists feel very or somewhat attached, compared to 45% of non-Zionists and 14% of anti-Zionists.
- Close to 90% of those who have lived in Israel or visited more than six times feel either very or somewhat attached to Israel, compared to 36% of those British Jews who have never visited.
- Around 90% of Jews who self-identify as either Haredi, Orthodox or Traditional feel very or somewhat attached to Israel, compared to 65% to 70% of those who self-identify as Reform/Progressive or Just Jewish.
- 90% of Jews who support the Conservative Party feel very or somewhat attached to Israel, compared to 64% of Jewish Labour supporters, 70% of Liberal Democrats, and 41% of Greens.
- Most British Jews say they are unlikely to make *aliyah* (emigrate to Israel) in the next five years. On a scale from 0 to 10, self-identifying Orthodox Jews score highest (3.7), followed by Haredi Jews (2.8) (despite the latter being weakly Zionist). Non-practising (1.0) and Reform/Progressive (1.2) Jews score lowest.
- British Jews who experienced an antisemitic incident in the year prior to the survey are more likely to consider *aliyah* (2.5) than those who did not experience such an incident (1.5). Self-identifying Zionists are far more likely (2.2) than non-Zionists (0.9).
- Younger Jews score considerably higher on this *aliyah* scale than older Jews: those in their twenties score highest at 2.2; those in their eighties score lowest at 0.9.

Working and volunteering within the Jewish community

- 18% of all working British Jews work professionally for a Jewish organisation, and an additional 9% work for an organisation that provides services in some way to the Jewish community.
- Jewish women are much more likely than Jewish men to work for a Jewish organisation (23% versus 14%), and self-identifying Haredi and Orthodox Jews are much more likely than those identifying with other denominations or none.
- Those in the toughest economic circumstances are three times as likely to work for a Jewish organisation than those who report that they are living comfortably.

- Close to three-quarters (72%) of all British Jews reported that they had volunteered in the year prior to the survey. 57% had volunteered for a Jewish organisation and 46% for a non-Jewish organisation.
- Within the Jewish sector, the most popular volunteering work is synagogue-related activities – 31% reported doing this.

Charitable giving

- 84% of British Jews consider charitable giving to be a very or somewhat important part of their Jewish identity.
- British Jews are much more likely to prioritise Jewish charities in the UK than Israel charities (43% versus 5%). Those prioritising Israel charities fell from 9% in 2013 to 5% in 2022.
- Jews are also more likely to prioritise aid for the poor overseas in their charitable priorities than Israel charities (9% versus 5%), but the proportion prioritising aid for the poor abroad has fallen from 13% in 2013 to 9% in 2022.
- Haredi and Orthodox Jews are much more likely to prioritise Jewish charities in the UK than general charities; Reform/Progressive, non-practising and 'Just Jewish' Jews are the opposite.
- Of the total amounts British Jews donated to charity in the year prior to the survey, 49% gave more than half to Jewish charities, compared to 43% who gave less than half. The remainder split their donations equally between the Jewish and non-Jewish sectors. This reflects a change over the past decade in favour of Jewish charities.
- The more money British Jews personally donate to charity, the more likely it is that they prioritise Jewish charities over non-Jewish ones.
- The stronger people's self-reported religiosity, the more likely they are to donate. On average, self-identifying Haredi and Orthodox Jews donate more to charity than all other denominational groups.
- Unsurprisingly, wealthier Jews give larger amounts to charity than poorer Jews, but there is no difference in this regard in terms of whether they prioritise Jewish or non-Jewish charities.

Antisemitism

- Close to a third (32%) of all British Jews said they had experienced some kind of antisemitic incident in the calendar year 2021.
- 14% said they had experienced a 'verbal' antisemitic attack, and 11% said they had experienced online antisemitic abuse or harassment targeted at them personally because they are Jewish.
- 7% said they had experienced antisemitic discrimination at work; very few (less than 1%) reported experiencing a physical antisemitic attack or antisemitic vandalism to their property.

- Younger people were much more likely than older people to have experienced an antisemitic incident. 39% of those aged 16 to 19 and 32% of those in their twenties said they had experienced one in 2021, compared to 3% of those aged in their eighties.
- Similarly, those currently in school, college or university were far more likely (35%) to have experienced an antisemitic incident than those who were employed or retired. Employed Jews are more likely than self-employed Jews to have experienced this (17% versus 11%).
- Self-identifying Haredi Jews were most likely to have experienced an antisemitic incident (39%), followed by self-identifying Orthodox ones (21%). Those who report having very strong religiosity were twice as likely to have experienced a verbal and systematic attack than even those whose religiosity is quite strong (29% versus 14%).
- The more attached people are to Israel, the more likely they are to report having experienced an antisemitic incident. 17% of those who are very attached report this, compared to 10% of those who are not at all attached.

Happiness


- The stronger a person's self-reported level of religiosity, the greater their self-assessed levels of happiness and life satisfaction. For example, when asked to score how happy they felt yesterday on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (completely), those with very strong religiosity scored an average of 8.0, compared to those with very weak religiosity, who scored 6.9.
- A similar relationship is found with regard to local Jewish community attachment. The more strongly attached people feel, the higher they tended to score on both the life satisfaction and happiness scales.
- These results are in line with other studies showing that people who are religiously active and participate in communal activities tend to be happier than others.

/ Jewish identity and belief

God and the Torah

Two of the most fundamental principles within Judaism are the existence of one God who created the world, and the idea that the Torah (the first five books of the Bible) is divine and was given to Moses at Mount Sinai.¹ Respondents were asked about their beliefs on both of these. Just over one in three Jews 'believe in God as described in the Bible,' although a further 41% subscribe to a 'higher power or spiritual force in the universe' (Figure 1). There is more scepticism when it comes to the origins of the Torah, with just 18% of Jews in the UK believing it is the word of God (i.e. almost half the proportion that believes in God), and close to half (47%) believing the Torah was written by human beings.²

Figure 1. Belief in God and the Torah (N=4,891)



Question (top bar): *Which of these statements comes closest to your views, even if none is exactly right?*

Response options as per the figure.

Question (bottom bar): *And which one of the following comes closest to describing your feelings about the Torah (the first five books of the Bible)?* Response options as per the figure.


For context, a similar question was asked of Jews in the United States in 2020, and when comparing the results, we can see that UK Jews are less likely to believe in God than their American co-religionists (Figure 2). On the other hand, they are more likely to believe in

1 This is part of Maimonides' (also known as Rambam) '13 Principles of the Jewish Faith'. See also original biblical references, including Genesis, chapter 1 and Exodus, chapters 19–24.

2 In 1995, JPR also asked UK Jews about their belief in the Torah. We found that 15% said 'The Torah is the word of God' (18% in NJIS), 31% said 'the Torah is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally, word for word' (35% in NJIS), and 54% said 'the Torah is an ancient book of history and moral precepts recorded by man' (47% in NJIS). This suggests that the Jewish population may have become a little more religious over the period that has passed (27 years), although caution is recommended with respect to direct comparability. Authors' calculations using original dataset.

God than the general population of the UK, where almost half (49%) of the population are non-believers, twice the proportion among UK Jews (25%).³

Figure 2. Belief in God, UK Jews, US Jews and the general UK population



Question (top bar): *Which of these statements comes closest to your views, even if none is exactly right?* Response options: *I believe in God as described in the Bible; I do not believe in God as described in the Bible, but I do believe there is some other higher power or spiritual force; I do not believe there is any higher power or spiritual force in the universe.*

Question (middle bar): *Which of these statements comes closest to your views, even if none is exactly right?*

I believe in God as described in the Bible; I do not believe in God as described in the Bible, but I do believe there is some other higher power or spiritual force in the universe; I do not believe there is any higher power or spiritual force in the universe.

Question (lower bar): *Do you believe in a God or a higher spiritual power?* Response options: *I believe in a God; I don't believe there is a God, but I do believe there is a higher spiritual power; I don't believe in a God or a higher spiritual power.*

(Data exclude 'Don't know' and 'Prefer not to say' options in the YouGov question).

Of course, levels of belief in God and the divine origins of the Torah are not uniform across the Jewish population. For example, Jewish men are slightly more likely to believe in God and the divinity of the Torah than Jewish women (Figure 3). There is also a notable age pattern, indicating that belief is strongest among Jewish people aged in their forties. Whether this is because belief grows as Jews approach middle age and declines thereafter (i.e. generational change), or because there is something specific about the experiences of this Jewish fortysomething group (cohort specific) is difficult to determine, although the smoothness of the pattern suggests the former rather than the latter. The pattern correlates with the family lifecycle and childrearing, and it is tempting to surmise that this may be driving Jewish people's beliefs.

While it is unsurprising that strictly Orthodox respondents almost universally believe in God and the divinity of the Torah, it is interesting to note that among self-defined 'Orthodox' Jews (i.e. those who 'would not turn on a light on Shabbat') (see section on Shabbat),⁴ more than two out of five (42%) do not believe that the Torah is 'the actual word of God'. It is also the case that 'Traditional' Jews are closer to Reform/Progressive Jews than to Orthodox ones with respect to belief in God, and even more so with regard to belief in the divine origin of the Torah, with just 13% believing this to be the case.


We can further see that synagogue membership and belief are only loosely related here. Certainly, those who do not belong to a synagogue tend not to believe in God

3 US data from the Pew Research Center's 2021 study, *Jewish Americans in 2020*. Authors' calculations using Pew dataset (weighted) available from <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/dataset/jewish-americans-in-2020>; UK data from YouGov: <https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/2isqp28jmv/YouGov%20-%20Christianity%20study.pdf>.

4 Most Orthodox Jews do not use electricity on Shabbat (the Sabbath), as it is prohibited by Jewish law.

as described in the Bible, but even among those who do belong, fewer than half (44%) believe this, and only about a quarter (26%) believe that the Torah is the actual word of God (see also Figure 19).

Figure 3. Belief in God and the Torah, by demographic and Jewish identity characteristics (N=4,892)




^ Jews who are not formally members of synagogues, but nevertheless attend one and feel a sense of belonging to it. The wording used in the questionnaire was "Although I am not a synagogue member I do belong to/attend a synagogue."

There is also a relationship between Jewish people’s beliefs in these regards and their political leanings. Supporters of the UK Conservative Party are far more likely to believe in God and the divine origins of the Torah than supporters of either the British Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats or the Green Party (Figure 4). Education is also associated with belief among Jews: those holding a degree are far less likely to believe in God or the divinity of the Torah than those who do not hold a degree.

Similarly, we observe a relationship with charitable giving. Jews who made at least one charitable donation in 2021, whether to a Jewish or general charity, are much more likely to be believers than those who did not make a donation in that year. Economic wellbeing is associated with belief too: the more challenging people’s economic circumstances are, the more likely they are to believe in God and the divine origins of the Torah. However, for all these relationships, it is important to recognise that causality is complicated. In this case for example, while it may be that challenging economic circumstances cause people to turn to God and Torah, it may equally be the case that those who believe are less concerned about materialism and wealth accumulation. In this context, the haredi community should be noted since it has the strongest belief but also a poorer economic profile than the non-haredi community. However, additionally, and more likely, it may be the case that other factors are at work making it appear that a relationship exists. For example, education, which as previously noted, correlates with belief, also correlates with economic wellbeing.

Figure 4. Belief in God and the Torah, by political and socioeconomic characteristics (N=4,892)



^ Data on education are longitudinal and are from JPR’s panel wave 2 survey.


Turning to other aspects of Jewish belief, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with three contentions about God and the nature of the universe. First, whether ‘the universe came about by chance’; second, whether ‘praying to God can help overcome personal problems’; and third, whether belief in God is, or is not, ‘central to being a good Jew’ (Figure 5).

In the Book of Genesis (*Bereshit* in Hebrew), the biblical account clearly conveys the idea that God created the world, although modern science obviously rejects this view. Invited to agree or disagree with a contention that challenges the biblical narrative – i.e. ‘the universe came about by chance’ – we see that more Jews are inclined to reject this idea than to accept it: 42% disagree, saying it did not come about by chance, compared with 33% who believe it did (Figure 5). However, and importantly, 25% of Jews say they don’t know if they agree or disagree with this fundamental statement about creation.

Respondents were also more likely to agree than disagree that praying to God can help overcome personal problems. 46% of Jews believe that this is the case, whereas 39% disagree with the contention – i.e. they do not believe that praying to God can overcome personal problems – although, again, we see uncertainty among many people, with 14% saying they don’t know.

In contrast to these two contentions about God and the universe, the third contention asks about the place of God in Jewish identity. There is a long tradition in Jewish social science investigating Jewish people’s conceptions of what constitutes ‘a good Jew’.⁵ As Jewishness can be expressed in religious, ethnic, cultural and national ways, one should not assume that God is, or even should be, central to all Jews’ Jewish being. Indeed, we see that for most Jews (69%), belief in God is not seen as central to being a good Jew, and only a quarter (26%) believe that it is (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Jewish people’s attitudes to God’s role in the world (N=4,891)




Looking at these data in terms of gender, a somewhat contradictory picture emerges. Compared with Jewish women, Jewish men are slightly more likely to believe in the power of prayer and that a ‘good Jew’ should believe in God, but Jewish men are also more likely than Jewish women to believe that the universe came about by chance (Figure 6).

5 The concept of a ‘good Jew’ has its origins in the work of Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum (*The Lakeville Studies, Jewish identity on the Suburban Frontier*, Basic Book Inc., New York, 1967), who noted that: “Exclamations may be heard in Lakeville [the fictional town of their study] such as: “X is not very good Jew,” “Y acts like a good Jew should act,” “Z thinks he’s a good Jew but as far as I’m concerned he’s not” (p.321).

In terms of age, on two of these items – the origin of the universe and the power of prayer – the middle-aged groups are stronger believers than either the younger or older ones, a pattern which we will see over and over again as we run through this report. That said, a different pattern can be seen with regard to agreeing that a good Jew should believe in God. Here, the younger age group (under thirty) stands out – they are notably more likely than their elders to maintain that belief in God is *not* central to being a good Jew.

Looking at the data through the lens of respondents’ political stance in the UK, we see that Conservative Party supporters stand out from the others as being very *unlikely* to agree the universe originated by chance and, complimentarily, being highly likely to believe in the power of prayer. Similarly, they also feel that belief in God is important to being a good Jew. And again, we see coherence in terms of educational qualifications, with degree holders being more likely to side with the scientific position on the origins of the universe and less likely to believe in the power of prayer or to support the contention that belief in God is central to being a good Jew.


Figure 6. Jewish people’s attitudes to God’s role in the world by political and socioeconomic characteristics – percent who Agree or Strongly agree (N=4,892)



^ Data on education are longitudinal and are from JPR's panel wave 2 survey.

In terms of Jewish denominational stream, attitudes are as might be expected. For example, the less Orthodox and those with weaker religiosity are more likely to agree that the universe came about by chance, and the more Orthodox and more strongly religious are more likely to believe in the power of prayer. We also see that the Orthodox and more strongly religious are more likely to agree that belief in God is a prerequisite for being a 'good Jew' (Figure 7). These relationships are replicated in terms of synagogue membership and indeed, charitable giving, with those who had made donations to Jewish and/or non-Jewish charities in the year prior to the survey resembling the Orthodox and stronger religiosity positions rather more than the non-Orthodox and weaker religiosity ones.

Figure 7. Jewish people's attitudes to God's role in the world, by Jewish identity characteristics (N=4,892)




Jewish denominational stream

There are multiple strands of identity within Judaism and numerous ways to sub-divide Jewish populations into different groups based on their beliefs and practices. However, there are labels that most Jewish people do understand and that have been used in social research for decades, and while they may be imperfect and do not necessarily align with synagogue groupings, they do provide an established and reliable means of interrogating the nature of Jewish identity. Respondents were asked to self-identify based on a pre-prepared list containing the following categories: Non-practising (i.e. secular/cultural); Just Jewish; Reform/Progressive; Traditional; Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on light on Shabbat); Haredi (strictly Orthodox, Hasidic); Mixed (both Jewish and another religion); None of these; and Other.

Just under one in five respondents (19%) self-identifies as either Orthodox or strictly Orthodox, almost exactly the same proportions as those who identify as Reform/Progressive (18%) and Non-practising (19%) (Figure 8). The single largest group, accounting for over a quarter of respondents (27%), is 'Traditional', a category that is discussed further below. 13% of respondents identify as 'Just Jewish' which, as we see here and in other surveys, is a category that closely aligns with secular Jewish positions. If we add in the 'Mixed' Jewish group (i.e. Jewish and another religion), we find that just over half (51%) of respondents identify with Jewish positions that are not Orthodox or Traditional.⁶

Figure 8. The main Jewish denominational strands (N=4,891)




But beyond their relative sizes, what are the key differences between these Jewish identity streams? From a demographic point of view, the two Orthodox strands and the Traditional one exhibit a slight over-representation of Jewish men, whereas the non-Orthodox Reform/Progressive and Just Jewish strands have an over-representation of Jewish women (Figure 9). In terms of age, the Haredi (strictly Orthodox) strand stands

⁶ It should be noted that these are the proportions for the *adult* Jewish population, so they do not necessarily match proportions in the whole Jewish population. In particular, because the Orthodox and especially the Haredi populations have a much higher proportion of children than other denominational groups, they constitute a larger part of the Jewish population as a whole than they do when looking exclusively at adults.

out, with by far the youngest age profile. All of the other strands are somewhat older, and the Traditional one stands out as the oldest of all.

Figure 9. Demographic and religious characteristics of the different Jewish denominational streams (N=4,891)



Measuring people’s self-assessed religiosity using a 4-point scale from ‘very strong’ to ‘very weak’, we find that both Orthodox and strictly Orthodox groups consist almost entirely of people who self-describe as being ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ religious. The self-assessed religiosity of the other groups is far weaker, with just over half of the Traditional and Reform/Progressive groups identifying as religious, and still smaller proportions among those identifying as Just Jewish and Non-practising. A final measure, shown in Figure 9, examines levels of Jewish social immersion by strand. Here we see

that the vast majority of people in the two Orthodox groups and the Traditional one say that a majority of their friends are Jewish, compared to those in the non-Orthodox groupings where clear minorities say this.

The fact that these groupings return consistent results in a coherent way is good evidence that they are indeed measuring important and real differences between these various streams of Jewish identity. However, a word is necessary about the category 'Traditional' which, at 27% of the total, is the largest and arguably most enigmatic group. What exactly is Traditional? This term is not common outside anglophone Jewish communities, but it has been used in many surveys in the UK over many decades and is often the largest grouping. Yet it does not align easily with any synagogue movement or mode of Judaism, and in that sense, is rather difficult to define. It is tempting to place Traditional at the boundary between Orthodoxy and non-Orthodoxy, and to see those who identify in this way as Orthodox in theory more than in practice. In some respects, this is what we do see, but in others, it is more complex. Traditional Jews align with Orthodoxy on some measures, and with non-Orthodoxy on others. We can see this in Figure 9, which shows that Traditional Jews are similar to non-Orthodox Reform/Progressive Jews in terms of their self-described level of religiosity, but resemble the Orthodox streams in terms of their Jewish social patterns.

Religious switching


An important question to consider about the Jewish identity of the UK Jewish community is how it is changing over time. There are a number of ways to assess this, and here we present two. The first approach is to compare information about the religious stream that people identify with in the present, with the religious stream in which they grew up. If the stream they experienced growing up is the same as the one they currently report, we can conclude there has been little to no change in their identity. If their current stream is more Traditional or more Orthodox than the one in which they grew up, we can conclude they have shifted to the 'right' in religious terms; conversely, if their current stream is less Traditional or less Orthodox than the one in which they grew up, we can conclude they have shifted to the 'left' religiously. When there is a change, we refer to this as 'religious switching.' The second approach measures two cross-sections taken at different timepoints. In this case we compare data from our 2013 National Jewish Community Survey (NJCS) survey⁷ with the 2022 data from the National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS). This measures compositional change (i.e. how the relative proportion of each group has moved since 2013).

Comparing current Jewish position with upbringing, we see that in general, most people in each stream reported no change between their current stream and the one in which they grew up (Figure 10). For example, 62% of Jews who grew up in Traditional homes say they are still Traditional now. Looking at those who did switch, we can see that many more have moved leftwards (27%) than rightwards (10%). Importantly, this scenario is repeated among those who were raised Orthodox, and among those raised Reform/Progressive. Overall, when compared with upbringing, current Jewish identity has moved to the left.

⁷ See: Graham, D., Staetsky, L.D., and Boyd, J. (2014). *Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

However, it should be noted that this is an imperfect measure. For example, the sample does not include people raised Jewish but who no longer identify as Jewish, so such people are missing from our data. Also, and most importantly, this is not a direct measure of change over time. The elapsed time between 'childhood' and the present is different depending on a person's age; it is shorter for younger adults and longer for older ones. Therefore, each person is reporting a different time reference, yet 'change' here is analysed as if it is from one period to another. In addition, for many people, the process of Jewish identity change is complex and may not be linear at all. It is conceivable, and indeed likely, for example, that some people may have moved religiously 'rightwards' at one point in their life, and 'leftwards' at another, or some other combination of religious switching.⁸

Figure 10. Religious switching: type of Jewish upbringing compared with current Jewish position (N=4,891)




The second approach allows us to measure change more directly.⁹ We can compare our data on denominational strand in 2022 with the equivalent data from the NJCS (2013) to gain a more realistic overall measure of change. In doing so, we reveal a different picture. The largest change is a *decline* in the Non-practising group, down from 29% to 20% (a 31% decline in proportionate terms) (Figure 11). And overall, the net change *is a slight shift towards the Orthodox position* – a 1 percentage point increase in the Orthodox groups (Haredi and Orthodox combined) strand, a 3 percentage point increase in the Traditional strand and a 4 percentage point *decrease* in the non-Orthodox groups (Non-practising/Reform/Progressive/Just Jewish/Mixed combined).¹⁰

8 Horowitz, B. (2003). *Connections and Journeys: Assessing Critical Opportunities for Enhancing Jewish Identity, A report to the Commission on Jewish Identity and Renewal UJA-Federation of New York*. New York: UJA.

9 Though not perfectly, since this is not a longitudinal measure. In other words, we are not measuring the identity of the same people in 2022 as we measured in 2013.

10 Percentage values may not align with Figure 11 due to rounding.

Figure 11. Change in Jewish denominational strand, 2013 (N=3,736) compared with 2022 (N=4,891)*




*Excluding 'Other' and 'None of these,' both of which are small and declined between the surveys.

How might we explain these contrasting measures? Figure 10 captures the thrust of change for individual respondents over the course of their lifetimes, and demonstrates that, at an individual level, the movement is leftwards. In a broader national environment of secularism, this is unsurprising. By contrast, Figure 11 captures change in the composition of the population at a collective level, and this is affected not only by the choices individual Jews make in terms of identity, but also by broader demographic processes taking place in the Jewish population. Crucially, in the nine years between the two surveys, and indeed for many years preceding the 2013 survey, an important demographic process was occurring. Orthodox and strictly Orthodox families were experiencing far higher birth rates than less Orthodox families. In relative terms this means that more babies were born into Orthodox or Haredi homes than into non-Orthodox or secular ones, with the end result being a slight shift to the religious right.

In sum, measuring change in Jewish identity is challenging and there are different ways to do it. Comparing Jewish upbringing with people's current position (Figure 10) – lifetime change – we see a movement to the left in religious terms, i.e. towards a more secular Jewish identity. On the other hand, when we compare two snapshots of Jewish identity over time – compositional change – we see a slight movement towards the more religious *right*, indicating the community is moving towards more orthodox positions.

Returning to the approach comparing upbringing with current position, we can also look at these data in terms of age and see that for the three largest groupings – Orthodox, Traditional, Reform/Progressive – switching is more common among younger respondents than older ones (i.e. religious stability is greater among older respondents). Furthermore, we can also see that when there is switching, younger respondents are more likely to move leftwards than older respondents.

Figure 12. Religious switching: type of Jewish upbringing compared with current Jewish, by age group




Jewish identity: 18 aspects of Jewishness

Jewish identity can be expressed in multiple ways. In order to try to capture the breadth of this richness, respondents were presented with a list of eighteen different aspects of Jewishness and invited to assess how important or unimportant each item is in terms of how they see themselves Jewishly. These items cover a wide range of themes, including religious practice and belief, ethical behaviour, cultural engagement, and sense of peoplehood. When we examine this by looking at the aspects respondents were most likely to consider as 'very important' to their identity, the item that tops the list is 'Remembering the Holocaust' (Figure 13). 71% of respondents said this, with a further 24% saying it was 'fairly important'; combined together, 95% felt that remembering the Holocaust was an important aspect of their Jewish identity. Following closely behind this item was 'Strong moral and ethical behaviour', which 69% of respondents said was very important to them, and again, a total of 95% of the population felt this was 'very' or 'fairly' important. Arguably, what these two items and the next most important item –

Combating antisemitism – have in common, is that they contain within them values of justice and fairness. Together with the fourth item on the list – ‘Feeling part of the Jewish People’ – which highlights the importance of belonging to the larger Jewish collective in Jewish identity, the top four items are essentially ethno-cultural in nature and are pretty much accepted by all Jews as being important to their Jewishness.

Figure 13. Level of importance attached to various aspects of Jewish identity, ordered by Very important (N=4,891 per item)




Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*

However, beyond these four items, there is increasing disagreement as we move down the list of what matters most to people’s Jewish identity. Indeed, at the bottom of the chart, we see that just 16% of Jews feel that ‘Studying Jewish religious texts’ is very important to their Jewish identity, with a further 25% feeling it is fairly important. In fact, less than 50% of Jews feel that each of the bottom four items are important to their Jewish identity, and it is notable that three of these – Keeping kosher, Prayer and Studying Jewish religious texts – are intrinsically religious items.

Four items are notable for being considered important overall, but are ranked lower because respondents were more inclined to consider these to be 'fairly' important rather than 'very' important. The first two of these are 'Supporting social justice causes' and 'Donating funds to charity', considered important by 84% and 85% of respondents respectively. Similarly, 'Volunteering to support charity' and 'Jewish culture (Jewish music, literature, art)' are considered important by 77% and 76% of respondents respectively, yet are ranked in 13th and 14th position when based on 'very' important. Thus, the ordering depends somewhat on how we choose to measure importance. Moreover, as we shall see, different Jewish subgroups rank these items in different ways.

Comparing these results with data from NJCS in 2013, we see that overall, there is remarkable similarity between the two sets of responses, suggesting Jewish identity has stayed rather static over the decade (Figure 14). That said, some changes are notable, in particular, the rise in the proportions saying that 'Remembering the Holocaust' and 'Combating antisemitism' are very important to their Jewish identity. Alongside this are more modest increases in the proportions saying that 'Feeling part of the Jewish People' and 'Sharing Jewish festivals with my family' are very important. This seems to suggest that the significance of the ethno-cultural aspects of Jewish identity have increased over this period, which may be exhibited in terms of stronger feelings regarding Jewish solidarity and peoplehood.

Figure 14. Proportion responding 'Very important' to various aspects of Jewish identity, NJIS (2022) (N=4,891 per item) and NJCS (2013) (N=3,736 per item)




Question (NJCS): *How important or unimportant are each of the following to your own sense of Jewish identity?*

Question (NJIS): *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*

This battery of questions allows us to develop quite a detailed picture of Jewish identity in the population. For ease of comparison, the following charts order the items alphabetically. In general, Jewish men and women show a similar pattern overall, but there are several differences worth noting (Figure 15). Men are more likely than women to consider religious items, such as ‘Keeping kosher’, ‘Prayer’, ‘Studying Jewish texts’, as well as ‘Marrying another Jew’ and ‘Supporting Israel’, to be very important. Women, by contrast, are more likely than Jewish men to consider ‘Combating antisemitism’, ‘Remembering the Holocaust’, ‘Sharing Jewish festivals with my family’, and ‘Supporting social justice causes’, to be very important. Thus, on average, it seems that Jewish men are rather more likely than Jewish women to prioritise religious items, whereas Jewish women appear to be somewhat more likely to prioritise socio-cultural items than Jewish men.


Figure 15. Proportion responding ‘Very important’ to various aspects of Jewish identity, by sex (N=4,891 per item)



Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*

In terms of age, we can see that only a few items are sensitive, i.e. they exhibit a gradient from younger to older respondents. In three examples, the younger the respondents are, the *less* likely they are to think the item is very important to their Jewish identity: ‘donating funds to charity’, ‘supporting Israel’ and ‘volunteering to support charity’ (Figure 16). In all of the other fifteen items, there is no such consistent age gradient, although on several of them, one particular cohort stands out, for example, those aged 30–44 on ‘Combating antisemitism’; those aged 60 and above on ‘Sharing festivals with my family’; and those aged 16–29 regarding ‘Strong moral and ethical behaviour’, ‘Marrying another Jew’, ‘Believing in God’ and ‘Keeping kosher’.


Figure 16. Proportion responding ‘Very important’ to various aspects of Jewish identity, by age (N=4,891 per item)



Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*

Yet compared with age and sex, the greatest differentiation on these Jewish identity items is found in terms of religiosity, and Jewish denominational stream. On most items there is a clear gradient from weak to strong religiosity. Indeed, in only four is this not the case: ‘Combating antisemitism’, ‘Jewish culture (Jewish music, literature, art)’, ‘Remembering the Holocaust’ and ‘Supporting social justice causes.’ In most cases, the gradient between those with the weakest and strongest religiosity is very steep indeed, most notably items that have a clear religious essence, such as ‘Keeping kosher’, ‘Observing at least some aspects of Shabbat’ and ‘Believing in God’ (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Proportion responding 'Very important' to various aspects of Jewish identity, by religiosity (N=4,891 per item)




Question: *How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?*

We can also use these eighteen items to gain a clearer picture of the differences between the various Jewish denominational groups (Figure 18). In most cases we see a gradient between the more and the less orthodox streams, just as we saw in terms of religiosity (Figure 17), but the self-defined 'Traditional' group – the largest one in the UK Jewish population – can be better understood in this context. People identifying as 'Traditional' lie midway between those identifying as Orthodox and those who see themselves as Reform/Progressive on several items: 'Keeping kosher', 'Marrying another Jew', 'Sharing festivals with my family', 'Socialising in predominantly Jewish circles' and 'Volunteering to support a charity'. However, the Traditional group is closer to the Orthodox one in terms of 'Supporting Israel' and

‘Supporting social justice causes’, but closer to the Reform/Progressive group in terms of: ‘Believing in God’, ‘Donating funds to charity’, ‘Observing at least some aspects of Shabbat’, ‘Prayer’, ‘Strong moral and ethical behaviour’ and ‘Studying Jewish religious texts.’ In all other instances there is no pattern or unity across the groupings. This, therefore, also tells us something important about the category Traditional. It lies between orthodoxy and progressivism on ethno-cultural items, but on more political issues (Israel and social justice) Traditional Jews look more like Orthodox Jews, and in terms of religious observance and Jewish textual learning, they look more like Reform/Progressive ones.

Figure 18. Proportion responding ‘Very important’ to various aspects of Jewish identity, by Jewish stream (N=4,891 per item)



Question: How important or unimportant are each of the following to how you see yourself as a Jewish person?

/ Jewish community attachment and engagement

How do Jews in the UK view the Jewish community? How do they engage with it, how attached do they feel to it, and how accepted do they feel by it? We attempt to answer these questions in this section and begin by looking at the institution that most closely embodies Jewish community – the synagogue. The synagogue, or ‘shul’, stands at the centre of Jewish communal life. But who belongs, who attends and how does the synagogue fit into the wider picture of the Jewish community?

Synagogue life

A majority of respondents said they belonged to a synagogue (57%), with a further 13% claiming an informal affiliation with one. Almost three in ten (29%) said they were not synagogue members. People choose not to belong to one for a variety of reasons, including accessibility, cost and, of course, differing attitudes to the importance or value of synagogue membership. The data show that membership is more likely among married Jews than those who have not been married; among older Jews than younger Jews; and among wealthier Jews than those who are struggling economically (Figure 19). And despite a wide array of Jewish denominational options available in the UK, religiosity is closely associated with synagogue membership. Nevertheless, almost a quarter (23%) of ‘very weakly’ religious Jews belong to a synagogue, and almost two out of five (37%) Jewish atheists do so.

For some other British faith communities, secularisation is often cited as a key cause for declines in belonging or attachment to religious institutions. So why might we see irreligious or secular Jews paying synagogue membership fees? An estimated 56% of all households across the UK with at least one Jewish person living within them held synagogue membership in 2016, the most recent occasion this was measured.¹¹ For most Jews, a synagogue is much more than a place of worship. It is a community centre that performs Jewish social, educational and cultural functions as well as overtly religious ones, and facilitates the marking of major life-cycle events, so it is a key focus of community life. Indeed, for many Jews, even religious services are social occasions, offering opportunities to meet and catch up with family and friends. Therefore, any decline in synagogue membership over time, as revealed in the most recent study of the topic,¹² points to a wider issue for Jewish communities than simply ‘secularisation.’


Over a quarter (27%) of respondents had not attended any synagogue prayer service in the twelve months prior to the survey, and a further 33% had only attended infrequently,

11 Casale Mashiah, D. and Boyd, J. (2017). *Synagogue membership in the United Kingdom in 2016*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research and Board of Deputies of British Jews.

12 Ibid.

such as on the High Holy Days of Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur (New Year and Day of Atonement respectively) (Figure 20). Just over two in five (41%) had participated at least monthly.


Figure 19. Who belongs to a synagogue? (N=4,890)



* The exact category wording is: "I believe there is some other higher power or spiritual force", and "I do not believe there is any higher power or spiritual force."

Data from NJCS (2013) allow us to compare how synagogue attendance has changed over the past decade. However, in doing so, it is important to bear in mind that NJIS took place when the COVID-19 pandemic was still of concern for some, particularly the more vulnerable members of the community. In addition, the question that was asked in 2022 allowed respondents to include online participation in synagogue services, something which itself grew out of the pandemic experience. Putting these caveats to one side, the data suggest that overall, there has not been much change in synagogue attendance, despite the pandemic (Figure 20).

Figure 20. Frequency of synagogue attendance/participation in previous 12 months, 2013 and 2022 (N=3,736 and N=4,891 respectively)



Question NJCS (2013): *In the past 12 months, how often have you attended a synagogue service?*


Question NJIS (2022): *In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in a synagogue prayer service whether in person and/or online?*

In brief, despite declining synagogue membership, when JPR last asked this question in NJCS (2013), we found exactly the same attendance results, with a minority (41%) of Jews attending frequently (monthly or more often) and most (59%) attending infrequently or not at all. Notwithstanding the fact that, in 2022, online ‘attendance’ was an option which was unavailable in 2013, it does look as if there has been a level of stability in this regard, despite concerns that the pressures of secularism, assimilation and the COVID-19 pandemic (with the associated impact of synagogue closures under lockdown), may have impacted people’s habitual attendance routine.

While the most frequent synagogue attendees are the most religiously observant respondents (88% of Orthodox* Jews say they attend synagogue monthly or more often, compared with 52% of Reform/Progressive Jews) (Figure 21), we found that self-described ‘Traditional’ Jews attend slightly *less* frequently than ‘Reform/Progressive’ Jews (48%). Gender is likely to be an important explanatory factor here: women are less likely to attend mainstream traditional Orthodox synagogues than progressive ones, partly because they do not have the same attendance obligations as men in traditional Orthodox synagogues. At the same time, progressive communities are egalitarian, so make no distinctions between the roles and responsibilities of men and women, thereby providing women with more opportunities to engage.

In addition, we also see that married Jews are far more likely to be frequent attendees than those who have never been married, and respondents aged between 40 and 79 attend more frequently than both younger and older respondents. These factors may well highlight the important role that family plays in synagogue attendance and reveal some of the challenges synagogues face in attracting younger people and catering for the needs of the elderly and infirm.


Figure 21. Who participates in synagogue services monthly or more often? (N=4,891)



To explore more deeply people’s reasons for attending synagogue, we asked two groups – frequent and infrequent attendees – what underscores their synagogue attendance behaviour. Among those who attend monthly or more often, who comprise about two-fifths (41%) of the Jewish population as a whole (Figure 20), the most common reason given for their synagogue attendance, among those offered, was ‘I feel a sense of belonging’, selected by well over half (61%) of these respondents (Figure 22). Over half (56%) also reported a spiritual motivation for their attendance (‘I find it spiritually meaningful’), and one in three frequent attendees (33%) said they did so ‘to see friends or to socialise’.

However, for those who attend infrequently or not at all (who comprise the other three-fifths (59%) of the population), half (51%) said ‘I express my Jewishness in other ways.’ This is difficult to interpret without further probing, but probably suggests that synagogue attendance is not seen as being particularly important or meaningful to them. The other main factors mentioned suggest a degree of estrangement, or an inability to connect with shul, with 44% of this group saying ‘I’m not religious’ and 27% saying ‘I’m just not interested’ (Figure 22). It is also worth noting that over 500 people provided a written comment to this question, with many citing work commitments, lack of time, and indeed fear of COVID-19 (the data were gathered in late 2022), as part of their explanation for their infrequent attendance.

Figure 22. Main reasons for attending and not attending synagogue (items are not independent)



Question: We are interested in understanding the reasons why people go to Jewish religious services. Please indicate whether each of the following is a reason why you attend. Response options: Because of my family, spouse or partner; Because I find it spiritually meaningful; Because I feel a sense of belonging; To continue my family's traditions; To see friends or to socialise; Because I feel a religious obligation; To feel connected to my ancestry or history; To learn something new; Because I would feel guilty if I didn't participate; Other, please specify.

Question: We are interested in understanding the reasons why people do or do not attend Jewish religious services. Please indicate whether any of the following are reasons why you do not attend more frequently. Response options: I'm just not interested; I express my Jewishness in other ways; It costs too much; I'm not religious; I don't feel welcome; I don't think I know enough to participate; There aren't any Jewish congregations where I live; Being in a crowd of people makes me feel anxious or insecure; I'm in poor health or find it difficult to get around; I fear for my security; I feel pressured to do more or give more; I am not Jewish; Other, please specify.


In the United States, the 2020 Pew Research Center study found that American Jews are half as likely to attend a synagogue monthly or more often than UK Jews (20% US v 41%).¹³ Moreover, the motivations for attending are also very different. Among those who do attend monthly or more often, 92% of American Jews do so because they 'find it spiritually meaningful', compared with 56% of UK Jews. The top reason in the US for not attending more frequently was 'I'm not religious,' at 67%, compared to 44% in the UK.

Engagement in Jewish community life

Beyond synagogue membership and attendance, respondents were asked about their current engagement 'with Jewish community life' on a scale from 0 ('Not at all engaged') to 10 ('Highly engaged'). 50% scored in the higher end of the engagement scale, a higher proportion than those scoring at the lower end of the scale at 38% (Figure 23). The remaining 12% situated themselves in the middle. However, it is noticeable that levels of engagement at that point (December 2022) were lower than they had been prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (down from 57%).

13 Pew 2021, *Jewish Americans in 2020*, op. cit., pp.22–23.

Figure 23. Level of engagement in Jewish community life before and after the COVID-19 pandemic (N=4,891)




Question: *How engaged were you with Jewish community life in the period before the pandemic, where 0 is 'Not at all engaged' to 10 is 'Highly engaged'?*

Question: *And how engaged are you with Jewish community life these days, where 0 is 'Not at all engaged' to 10 is 'Highly engaged'?*

A convenient way to assess the engagement scale among different groups is to measure the mean score. Overall, the mean score for engagement ‘these days’ was 5.4. We see that men (6.0) are slightly more engaged in Jewish community life than women (5.3), and that married people (5.9) are more engaged than those not previously married (5.0) (Figure 24). On the whole, engagement in Jewish community life is closely associated with religiosity and religious practice. It is also the case that in-married Jews are more communally engaged than intermarried Jews.


Figure 24. Mean score for level of engagement in Jewish community life by: (N=4,891)



Jewish community attachment and acceptance

Respondents were also asked how attached they feel to their ‘local Jewish community,’ with one in three (33%) saying they feel ‘strongly attached’ and a further 28% saying they feel ‘moderately attached’. A very similar proportion (32%) said they feel ‘weakly’ or ‘not at all’ attached. Communal attachment is closely associated with communal engagement, and it is very clear that the greater the feelings of attachment, the more frequently respondents participate in synagogue services (Figure 25).

Figure 25. Attachment to local Jewish community by frequency of synagogue attendance (N=4,891)




Question: *In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in a synagogue prayer service, whether in person and/or online?* Response options as per chart.

Question: *How attached (or otherwise) do you currently feel to your local Jewish community?*

Feelings of communal attachment also go hand-in-hand with feelings of communal acceptance. For example, married respondents are much more likely to feel strongly attached and accepted than those who have never been married; older respondents feel more attached and accepted than younger respondents; and the more strongly religious feel more attached and accepted than the more weakly religious (Figure 26).

Figure 26. Who feels 'Strongly attached' to and 'Very well accepted' by their local Jewish community? (N=4,894)




Question: Although people have different understandings of what constitutes the Jewish community, in general, how accepted do you feel by the Jewish community? Do you feel you are [response options]: Very well accepted; Somewhat accepted; Not very well accepted; Not accepted at all; Don't know; Prefer not to say.

Question: How attached (or otherwise) do you currently feel to your local Jewish community? Response options: Strongly attached; Moderately attached; Weakly attached; Not at all attached; There is no local Jewish community where I live.

Evidently, feelings of communal acceptance are closely related to religiosity, an intriguing finding given the diversity of Jewish religious options available in the UK. The survey asked the 11% of respondents who said they felt 'not at all accepted' or 'not very well accepted' why they felt this way. The most common reason, reported by 40% of this sub-group,

was their 'views on Israel/Zionism',¹⁴ and analysis of their socio-religious profile shows that the vast majority of these people are likely to perceive their views as being further to the political left than the larger Jewish communities of which they are part. Beyond this, a notable number of respondents used the open 'Other' option to reference being a convert and/or a patrilineal Jew as a key reason for not feeling fully accepted.

Figure 27. You said you do not feel fully accepted by the Jewish community. Is this because of your: (N=368)



14 It is important to note that the survey took place in December 2022, many months prior to the war that started on 7 October 2023.


/ Jewish practice

This section investigates several of the key rituals, customs and behaviours that Jewish people observe to varying degrees. Judaism contains a plethora of laws and practices that encompass more or less every aspect of everyday life, as well as cyclical rituals that punctuate the week and the festival days, and the celebrations that demarcate the Jewish calendar.

Shabbat

The origins of Shabbat (the Jewish Sabbath) lie in the biblical account of the creation story, when, on the seventh day, God rested. Drawing on this biblical account, Shabbat is observed as a day of rest from usual work activities. According to tradition, Shabbat starts on a Friday evening at sundown and is observed in a variety of ways, including eating a meal(s) with family, friends and others, visiting the synagogue, and observing various home rituals and prohibitions. Respondents were asked if they attend a Friday night meal most weeks, and 61% said that they do (Figure 28).¹⁵ While attending a family meal at home can be a routine matter (albeit at the expense of participating in other social activities), other practices, especially those related to prohibitions, are more demanding. One such example relates to the prohibition from igniting a fire on Shabbat, which rabbinical Judaism extends to not operating anything electrical (e.g. switching on lights). Far fewer respondents (20%) observe this practice.

Figure 28. Shabbat observance: Friday night meal and electric light switches (N=4,891)




Question: *Which of the following Shabbat practices do you currently observe?*

15 In this section, all data relate to individuals. However, practices such as a Friday night meal and candle lighting take place in the home, and usually with others. In that sense it is arguably more accurate to measure household behaviour for such practices, but for comparability we have focused on the individual. For the record, the results based on the household are: Attend a Friday night meal most weeks: 48%; Are candles lit in your home on Friday night? Every Friday: 41%, Occasionally: 31%, Never: 28%. These percentages are lower than those based on individuals because of the direct relationship between household size and religiosity: i.e. there are relatively fewer religious households in the Jewish population than religious individuals, hence any proportions will be depressed.

Respondents were also asked how frequently they observe other more or less demanding Shabbat practices. At the less demanding end of the spectrum, it is traditional to light a pair of candles on Friday nights to welcome in Shabbat (traditionally done by women), and half (51%) of respondents say this happens in their home either every week or frequently. At the more demanding end, Orthodox law also prohibits travelling in motor vehicles on Shabbat, and 23% of respondents said that they do not drive on Shabbat, similar to the 20% who refrain from using electric light switches.


Figure 29. Shabbat observance: candle lighting and driving (N=4,891)



Question (top): *Are candles lit in your home on Friday night?* Response options: Never; Occasionally; Every Friday night.
 Question (bottom): *Some Jews do not travel in cars or use public transport on Shabbat due to the prohibitions of Jewish law. Do you travel on Shabbat?* Response options: Never; Occasionally; Frequently.

Data from our National Jewish Community Survey (NJCS, 2013) and our National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS, 2022) allow us to compare how Shabbat observance has changed over the decade (Figure 30). As with other comparisons between these two datasets, the change is small, but in this case, it is notable that there has been an increase in Shabbat observance based on these four practices.

Figure 30. Shabbat observance, NJCS (2013) compared with NJIS (2022) – various practices (NJCS 2013: N=3,736, NJIS 2022: N=4,891)




As with all Jewish practices, the likelihood of observance is dependent upon various characteristics. Attendance at a Friday night meal is most common among those aged in their forties, and not dissimilarly, the more restrictive prohibition on the use of motor

vehicles is most likely to be observed among those in their thirties and forties (Figure 31). The more Orthodox the respondent, the more likely they are to observe Shabbat practices, and we see that virtually all Haredi and Orthodox Jews not only attend Friday night meals most weeks, but also do not drive on Shabbat. Once again, the Traditional group exhibits more complex behaviour: in terms of Friday night meals, their behaviour is more akin to the Orthodox groups, whereas in terms of not driving, it is much closer to non-Orthodox Jewish behaviour.

Synagogue attendance is also a major aspect of Shabbat observance and is closely associated with the observance of other Shabbat rituals. Those who attend synagogue services more often are more likely to attend Friday night meals most weeks and not use a car on Shabbat.


Figure 31. Shabbat observance, by various characteristics (N=4,891)



^ This group of results draw on the question: *In the past 12 months, how often have you participated in a synagogue prayer service whether in person and/or online?*

In addition to religious rituals, it is also common for Jewish people to mark Shabbat in less formal ways. For example, 58% of respondents said that they make time for family or friends, and half say they take a break from work (Figure 32).

Figure 32. Other ways of observing Shabbat (N=4,891)



Question: *And considering other ways people may observe Shabbat, do you regularly do any of the following because it is Shabbat?*

Keeping kosher

Kashrut, or Jewish dietary law, relates to food that has been certified as kosher by a *beit din* (Jewish rabbinic court). This can refer to all sorts of food, but here we focus on meat, as this is the most common food type that Jews are likely to purchase in which their attitudes towards kashrut can be most readily measured. However, 'keeping kosher' is not simply about *what* one consumes, but also *how* one consumes it, and another aspect of maintaining a kosher home is the separation of dairy and meat products and utensils. Jews who observe kashrut wait for a period of time (often six hours, but some observe shorter periods) before consuming milk products after eating meat, and more generally, keep meat and dairy products separate and use different crockery and utensils for each. Household representatives¹⁶ were asked whether kosher meat was purchased for their homes and whether they separated milk and meat utensils at home. The data show that the two practices are closely aligned: 40% of households purchase only kosher meat for their homes, and 39% separate milk and meat utensils. (A separate analysis indicates that 36% of non-vegetarian households observe both practices.)

Among the two orthodox streams, keeping kosher both in terms of purchasing meat and separating utensils is universal, compared with around three-quarters of the Traditional group (Figure 33). By contrast, only a minority (16% or fewer) of householders who are Reform, Just Jewish or Secular/cultural observe these practices.


As expected, there is a very close association between kashrut observance and religiosity, although it is apparent that 'very strong' religiosity is not equivalent to being orthodox. For example, while 99% of Orthodox families are kosher, only 78% of Orthodox householders self-describe as having very strong religiosity. This is likely due to there being a discrepancy between Jewish practices of the household (keeping kosher) and

¹⁶ Since this was an online survey, it is possible that more than one person from any particular household answered the questionnaire. To avoid duplication of household level data – i.e. to ensure certain results relate to unique households – a question was included in the survey asking which person in the household had the first birthday in the calendar year. Although this does have some analytical drawbacks, it provides a convenient proxy for identifying household reference persons.

beliefs of the individual (personal level of religiosity). For example, individuals sometimes make religious compromises within families to accommodate the preferences of other household members.

Finally, because kosher meat is generally more expensive than non-kosher meat, one might hypothesise that families in financial difficulty may choose to save money by purchasing non-kosher meat. However, for most Jewish families, there does not seem to be a relationship between their economic circumstances and their observance of kashrut (Figure 33). That said, for those experiencing the most serious economic disadvantage, i.e. people who are 'Finding it quite/very difficult', there *does* appear to be a relationship, since we can see a notable drop-off between them and those who are in the next economic group up ('Just about getting by'), at least with regard to the purchasing of kosher meat for the home (26% v 40%).

Figure 33. Proportion of Jewish families that only buy kosher meat and separate milk and meat utensils at home (excluding vegetarian families) (N=3,818 households)




Question: *What kind of meat, if any, is bought for your home and which was bought during your childhood?* Response options: *Only kosher meat; Non-kosher meat, but not pork products; Non-kosher meat, including pork products; NA, vegetarian or vegan.*

Question: *Do you currently separate milk and meat utensils at home?* Response options: *Yes, No, NA, vegetarian or vegan.*

The decision to consume kosher meat at home is made ultimately at the household level. However, the consumption of meat *outside* the home, for instance in restaurants, is more

personal in nature. While most people are consistent with their eating habits, 11% of Jews eat kosher meat at home but are content to eat non-kosher meat out (Figure 34).¹⁷

Figure 34. The consumption of kosher meat inside and outside the home* (N=4,082 individuals)



* Excluding vegetarians (N=809) (see footnote)

Question: *What kind of meat, if any, is bought for your home and which was bought during your childhood?*

Response options: *Only kosher meat; Non-kosher meat, but not pork products; Non-kosher meat, including pork products; NA, vegetarian or vegan.*

Question: *Do you eat non-kosher meat outside your own home (e.g. in restaurants or private homes) and did you do so during your childhood?* Response options: *Only kosher meat; Non-kosher meat but not pork products; Non-kosher meat including pork products; NA, vegetarian or vegan.*

With the exception of haredi Jews and those with Very strong religiosity, all people are less likely to only eat kosher meat out than they are to do so at home (Figure 35). In terms of age, we see that the dissonance between the in and out values increases as age increases; in other words, the younger people are, the more consistent their kosher meat-eating habits.


While three-quarters of Traditional Jews only eat kosher meat at home, half only do so outside the home. And while we would expect to see an association between kosher meat consumption and religiosity, it is also notable that the dissonance between only eating kosher meat at home and outside the home tends to increase as religiosity decreases.

Finally, returning to the matter of kosher meat being more expensive than non-kosher meat, we find that the likelihood of eating kosher meat out increases as economic disadvantage *increases*. In other words, cost does not appear to be a predictive factor in kosher meat consumption. Whilst this may sound like a counterintuitive result, it is almost certainly the outcome of other factors. For example, 100% of strictly Orthodox Jews eat kosher meat out, yet this stream has a considerably lower economic profile than other ones.¹⁸

17 17% of the sample reported being vegetarian (N=809 individuals). Of this sub-group, three quarters (75%) were vegetarian in and out of the home; a further 11% were vegetarian at home but not outside the home; and 14% were vegetarian outside the home but not at home.


18 National Jewish Identity Survey data indicate that 7% of the sample is 'Finding it quite or very difficult' financially. However, this is the case for 17% of the strictly Orthodox, with all other streams being between 5% and 7%.

Figure 35. Kosher meat consumption inside and outside the home, by various characteristics (N=4,176 individuals – excludes vegetarians)



For a restaurant to be certified as kosher, it is not simply a question of serving kosher meat; it is also about the separation of milk and meat, and indeed strict wider observance of Jewish religious law. However, we were interested to know whether people who only eat in kosher restaurants would also eat in a vegetarian restaurant, even if it was not certified as kosher, given that there is little to no risk of food there coming into contact with non-kosher meat. Three quarters (74%) of those who only eat kosher meat out said that they would eat in such a restaurant (Figure 36). However, the likelihood of their doing so depends on their level of religiosity, with the more strongly religious being less likely to. Among 'Traditional' Jews who only eat kosher meat out, almost all would eat in an uncertified vegetarian restaurant, whereas this is the case for only half of Orthodox Jews.

Figure 36. Acceptability of eating in a non-kosher vegetarian restaurant among those who will only eat kosher meat out (N=2,669)



Question: *Would you eat in a non-kosher restaurant that only sells vegetarian food?*


Rosh Hashanah

Lived Judaism involves the observance of numerous traditional Jewish festivals and holidays. Some of these have a heavier emphasis on the synagogue, prayer and religious observance than others; many involve families coming together for meals.

Rosh Hashanah (the Jewish New Year) is one of the major annual Jewish holidays involving both synagogal and familial elements, and takes place in September or early October. We asked respondents to tell us whether and how they had participated in Rosh Hashanah synagogue services and observed related rituals at home in September 2022, a few months before the survey fieldwork took place. Three quarters (74%) of Jews said that they had observed rituals at home such as lighting candles and eating apple and honey (Figure 37).¹⁹ Over half (57%) said they had attended a synagogue service in-person, and 15% had participated in an online synagogue service or event (see note under Figure 37).

¹⁹ These data relate to individual responses, and these rituals will have taken place in other people's homes in some cases. As with Shabbat and all festivals, candles are lit at the start of Rosh Hashanah. The ritual of eating apple and honey symbolises wishes for a sweet new year and is the most well-known and common ritual involving the use of symbolic foods to represent blessings for the new year.

Figure 37. Rosh Hashanah observance (N=4,891)



Question: *Thinking back to Rosh Hashanah in September (2022), did you do any of the following?* Response options as per chart plus *None of these*.

^ While COVID-19 restrictions had been fully lifted by the time Rosh Hashana was celebrated in September 2022, there were still some vestiges of concern from some community members, and online services and events were being held, especially by non-Orthodox Jewish communities. Therefore, the data may not be typical since Orthodox Jews would not have had this option unless they took place before or after the holiday itself (during which it would be prohibited).

Compared with Jewish women, Jewish men were more likely to have attended a Rosh Hashanah synagogue service (in person), but less likely to have observed ritual practices at home. In terms of age, the likelihood of attending in-person synagogue services increased with age, peaking in the forties and steadily decreasing thereafter. A similar pattern was observed in terms of home rituals. But it is also apparent that the older people

are, the more likely they were to have participated in Rosh Hashanah synagogue services and events online.

The more strongly religious and more Orthodox Jews are, the more likely it is that they attended an in-person synagogue service. The Orthodox and the Very strongly religious were more likely to have attended in-person synagogue services than to have observed Rosh Hashanah rituals at home (Figure 37). Among the non-Orthodox and more weakly religious, as well as those without synagogue membership or association, it is apparent that despite low levels of synagogue attendance, many nevertheless participated in home rituals: for example, half of non-practising Jews (48%) reported observing such rituals in the home. It is not clear why orthodox Jews are more likely to have attended a synagogue service on Rosh Hashanah than to have observed rituals at home and further analysis of the data is required for clarification.


One third (34%) of Reform/Progressive respondents said that they had participated in at least one *online* synagogue service or event. This is also the case for one in five (21%) of those who are Quite strongly religious.

Fasting on Yom Kippur

The holiest day in the Jewish calendar is Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) when it is customary for Jews to fast for 25 hours, abstaining from both food and water. Respondents were asked to report on what their usual practice is on Yom Kippur. Just over half (56%) said they fast on Yom Kippur ‘every year’, and one in five (18%) said they never fast. A further 13% said they do not fast ‘due to health reasons’.


If we compare these results with those gathered in 2013 for NJCS, we see that the pattern overall is quite similar, but among those for whom health is not a factor in their decision about whether to fast on Yom Kippur, we see there has been a modest increase in the likelihood of fasting.

Figure 38. Tendency to fast on Yom Kippur, NJIS (2022) compared with NJCS (2013) (NJIS: N=4,891, NJCS: N=3,736)



The likelihood of fasting increases initially with age, peaking in the forties, before steadily declining with each successive age band (Figure 39). This is similar to the age pattern recorded in terms of Rosh Hashanah observance. It is interesting to note that the choice of not fasting due to health reasons mirrors this pattern. And while age is probably the main driver of why health prevents some people from fasting – almost a third of those aged 80 and above do not fast due to health reasons – it is also likely that religiosity plays a role, with the more religious being more willing to fast in spite of any health concerns.

Figure 39. Whether fast on Yom Kippur (N=4,891)




Question: Do you fast on Yom Kippur? Response options: Every year; Most years; Some years; Never; No - due to health reasons.

Passover seder and Chanukah observance

The most commonly observed Jewish festivals are Pesach (Passover) and Chanukah. Respondents were asked whether or not they attend a seder (ritual meal) at Pesach and seven out of ten (71%) said they do so ‘every year’; just 7% said they ‘never’ do so (Figure 40). Almost exactly the same results were observed in terms of Chanukah. Respondents were asked if they generally participate in candle lighting ceremonies, and again we find that 71% do so every year.


Figure 40. Frequency of participation in a Passover seder and candle lighting at Chanukah (N=4,891)



Question (top bar): *At Passover (Pesach) do you typically attend a Seder (Passover meal)?* Response options as per chart
 Question (bottom bar): *During Chanukah, do you typically participate in one or more candle lighting ceremonies, either at home or elsewhere?* Response options as per chart

The likelihood of respondents participating in a Passover seder or Chanukah candle lighting ceremony is remarkably similar whichever metric we examine. The one minor difference is age. Although the likelihood of participation in both first increases by age, peaking in the forties, but then decreases thereafter, it is evident that compared with attending a Passover seder, lighting candles at Chanukah is slightly more common among the younger generations and slightly less so among the older ones (Figure 41).


Figure 41. Whether attend a Passover seder 'Every year', and whether participate in a candle lighting ceremony at Chanukah 'Every year' (N=4,891)



Commemoration events


In addition to the various traditional Jewish festivals and holy days, the Jewish calendar also has several modern days of remembrance, such as the memorial days of Yom HaShoah (Israel's Holocaust memorial day), Yom HaZikaron (Israel's memorial day for Israeli soldiers killed in battle and Israeli victims of terrorism) and International Holocaust Memorial Day (marked by non-Jews as well as Jews), as well as the celebratory Israel Independence Day (Yom Ha'Atzma'ut). Of these four occasions, respondents were most likely to have observed or marked a Holocaust Memorial Day event (54%) (Figure 42).

Figure 42. Participation in Jewish commemoration events in the previous 12 months (N=4,891)



Question: *And over the past 12 months, which of the following, if any, have you observed or marked either in person or online?*

Figure 43. Attended at least one commemoration event in previous 12 months (N=4,891)




Overall, two out of three (67%) respondents had attended or marked at least one of these events either in person or online in the previous twelve months. Unlike many other variables examined in this analysis, the likelihood of marking these events is only

tangentially related to Jewish religiosity. The youngest age group – those aged under thirty – are the most likely to have attended such an event (74%) (Figure 43). In terms of religiosity, the haredi group stands out with just one in three (34%) having attended at least one event, considerably lower than even the non-practising secular cultural group (52%). However, setting haredim aside, the Orthodox are the most likely to have attended such an event (83%), in stark contrast to haredim. This difference is also reflected in terms of religiosity, where the *quite* strongly religious are the most likely to have attended such an event rather than the *very* strongly religious. Further, synagogue members are *less* likely to have attended such an event than those who are not formally members but do attend a synagogue. But given that three of the four remembrance days listed are Israel specific, the most important relationship is with emotional attachment to Israel, where there is a clear and strong association between the level of attachment and likelihood of participating in these events.

Jews and Christmas

While Christmas is obviously not a Jewish festival, we were interested to know the extent to which Jewish families observed the festival in any way, so we measured it by looking at any tendency among Jewish people to decorate their homes with a Christmas tree. This revealed that almost three out of ten Jews (28%) said they had a Christmas tree at home either ‘some/most years’ or ‘every year’ (Figure 44). Having a Christmas tree is more common among those aged under forty and, unsurprisingly, more common among Jews who are less Orthodox and less religious. For example, almost no Orthodox Jews have a Christmas tree, but well over half of non-practising Jews (58%) do so at least some years. There is a notable difference between the habits of Traditional Jews and Reform/Progressive Jews in this regard, the latter being almost four times as likely to have a Christmas tree as the former (38% Reform/Progressive v 8% Traditional). Unsurprisingly, a Christmas tree is much more likely in intermarried families: while 4% of in-married couples said they put up a Christmas tree every year, this was the case for 45% of intermarried couples (see Figure 70).

Figure 44. Frequency of Jewish people having a Christmas tree (N=4,891)



Question: *Do you typically have a Christmas tree in your home and did you have one during your childhood?*
 Response options (for both periods): *Never; Some years; Most years; Every year.*


Circumcision and Jewish funerals

It is customary for Jewish parents to circumcise their baby sons at eight days old if they are healthy, in a ritual practice known as *brit milah*. It is typically carried out by someone trained in this practice (not necessarily a medical surgeon) called a *mohel*, and usually takes place at home or in a synagogue. Overall, 68% of families reported that they had had at least one son (of any age), and the more Orthodox the family, the more likely it is that they have had a son, since Orthodox women have higher fertility rates than non-Orthodox women.

The vast majority (85%) of Jewish families who have had a son have chosen to circumcise him (Figure 45). While most families have chosen circumcisions to be carried out by a *mohel* (76%), some have opted to have a medically trained surgeon perform the procedure in a hospital, generally without Jewish ritual customs (9%) – perhaps as a matter of preference, and perhaps because the child is medically vulnerable in some way.

The more orthodox the family, the more likely they are to have chosen to have their son circumcised, and the more likely they are to have chosen to have the circumcision carried out by a mohel. All Orthodox families and virtually all Traditional families who had had a son, have chosen to circumcise him (Figure 45). By definition, non-practising Jews were least likely to have chosen circumcision (although 60% of them do), and in cases where they have opted to do so, they are also the most likely of all groups investigated to have had this take place outside of Jewish religious auspices (20%). That said, even among this group, two-thirds of those choosing to circumcise their sons used a mohel.


Figure 45. Proportion of families who have circumcised their son by Jewish stream (N=3,624 householders who have had a son)



Question: *Have you had a son, and if so, was he circumcised? If you have more than one son, please answer for your youngest son.* Response options: *I have not had a son; Yes, he was circumcised under Jewish religious auspices (i.e. by a mohel); Yes, he was circumcised, but not under Jewish religious auspices (e.g. in a hospital); No, he was not circumcised; Prefer not to say.*

At the other end of the life cycle, most Jews (79%) plan to have a Jewish funeral. The survey did not inquire whether that was going to be a burial or a cremation, although a strong majority would be burials, in accordance with traditional Jewish practice. The likelihood of wishing to have a Jewish funeral is related to the level of orthodoxy, but we also see that the less orthodox people are, the more uncertain they are about whether they wish to have one. Among non-practising Jews, almost a quarter (24%) say they don't know, and just 37% say that they wish to have a Jewish funeral (Figure 46).

Figure 46. Do you wish to have a Jewish funeral? (N=4,891)




Question: *When the time comes, do you yourself wish to have a Jewish funeral?* Response options: *Yes; No; Don't know.*

/ Jewish religious and cultural consumption

The ethno-religious nature of Jewish identity means that there are multiple cultural and ethnic behaviours and habits that Jewish people engage in, beyond the purely religious. Respondents were asked about various Jewish products they may have purchased in the previous twelve months, and the most commonly selected one from the list provided was a *challah* (79%), the traditional kosher plaited loaf that is eaten on Friday night and Jewish festivals (Figure 47). Half of the respondents (53%) said they had purchased a *yahrzeit* (memorial) candle, lit on the anniversary of the death of close relatives, and close to half (48%) had purchased a non-religious Jewish-themed book.

In addition to product purchases, respondents were also asked about their consumption of Jewish cultural entertainment. Almost three quarters (72%) had seen a film or series on a Jewish theme on television or a streaming service in the previous twelve months, and almost one in three (31%) had seen a play or performance on a Jewish topic.


Figure 47. Jewish religious and cultural purchases and consumption (N=4,891)



Question (top): *In the past 12 months have you purchased any of the following items?* Response options as per chart.
Question (bottom): *And which of the following, if any, have you done during the past 12 months, either in person or online?*
Response options as per chart.

To assess whether there has been any change in the types of Jewish cultural and religious consumption these items represent, we can compare the data with results from NJCS 2013. As we have seen repeatedly in this report, relatively little change is observed over the period.


Figure 48. Proportion of Jews who had purchased a Jewish religious or cultural object in the previous 12 months: 2013 compared with 2022 (N=3,736 and 2022: N=4,891 respectively)



Question (NJCS 2013): Which of the following, if any, have you done during the past 12 months? Selected response options: Watched a TV programme on a Jewish topic; Bought a book on a Jewish topic; Bought a Jewish ritual object; Attended a Jewish film, theatre or music festival event; Attended a Jewish art exhibition; Bought a piece of Jewish art.

In addition to purchasing Jewish products and viewing Jewish entertainment, we also asked whether respondents had visited museums or cultural sites with a Jewish theme or connection, whether in the UK or abroad. 37% said they had visited a Jewish cultural or historical site overseas, compared with 23% who said they had done so in the UK (Figure 49).


Figure 49. Proportion of Jews who had visited a Jewish museum or cultural/historical site in the UK or overseas in the last 12 months (N=4,891)



Question: And which of the following, if any, have you visited during the past 12 months? Response options as per chart as well as: None; Can't remember.

It is here that we see the greatest difference between the present data and those collected in 2013. For both visiting Jewish museums in the UK and visiting them overseas, we see significant declines compared with 2013 (Figure 50). This contrasts with most of the comparisons we have seen between 2013 data and 2022 data that show relatively little change in the period. In this case, however, it seems highly likely that the decline is due mainly to the remaining impact of the COVID-19 pandemic restricting the amount of travel people could or were willing to undertake in the year prior to December 2022.


Figure 50. Proportion of Jews who had visited a Jewish museum in the UK or overseas in the previous 12 months: 2013 compared with 2022 (N=3,736 and N=4,891 respectively)



When we extract six of these activities that are non-religious in nature (i.e. secular/cultural – see items listed in the note under Figure 51), and assess how many of these, if any, respondents had done in the previous twelve months, we find that overall, one in three (33%) had done three or more. Yet as we show in Figure 51, the breakdown in terms of various Jewish sociodemographic characteristics is rather different from most of those that we have seen in this report, and reveals the different ways that less religious and less Orthodox Jews express their Jewish identity.

Demographically, women are more likely to have done three or more of these non-religious activities than men, and people in their twenties are more likely than any other age group to have done these things (38%), followed by those in their fifties and sixties. However, what is especially striking is the breakdown by Jewish denominational stream. Here Reform/Progressive Jews stand out as being the group most likely to have done three or more of these Jewishly cultural activities (42%), whereas haredi Jews were by far the least likely (9%), followed by the Orthodox (30%). And while there is a religious gradient of sorts to the data, with the quite strongly religious being the most likely (38%) to have done them, the very strongly religious are found to be the *least* likely (27%). So these cultural Jewish activities appeal particularly to those who are relatively unengaged communally: for example, 40% of those who feel not very well accepted by the Jewish community had done three or more in the previous twelve months. Finally, and unusually, it is both those who are most *and* least attached to Israel who do the most of these (36% each).

Figure 51. Engagement in three or more non-religious[^] Jewish cultural activities by various characteristics (N=4,891)



[^] This refers to three or more of the following six activities: [Purchased a] Non-religious book on a Jewish topic (e.g. a novel, history book); [Purchased a] Piece of Jewish art; Seen a film or series on a Jewish theme (e.g. on TV or a streaming service); Attended a Jewish music event; Seen a play or performance on a Jewish topic; Visited a Jewish-themed art exhibition.


/ Jewish education

Jewish educational experiences growing up

Jewish education takes place in a multitude of contexts, from formal Jewish schooling to informal experiences such as Jewish youth camps, weekends away and organised Israel programmes. We were interested to understand the number of these ‘critical Jewish experiences’ respondents had had, and they were presented with two lists: the first included experiences that typically take place in one’s local Jewish community, and the second was focused on educational experiences that take place in Israel. In total, fourteen items were listed (if Bar/Bat Mitzvah is counted as one).

The most common Jewish educational experience is a Bar Mitzvah ceremony (83%), although this only applies to Jewish males. By comparison, just over half as many females (44%) reported having had a Bat Mitzvah ceremony (Figure 52). All other items are for both sexes, and the most frequently mentioned educational activities were involvement in a Jewish youth group (58%) and part-time classes in a synagogue (cheder) (57%). The most common Israel-based educational programme is an ‘Israel tour’ organised by a youth movement or organisation, experienced by one in three of all adult Jews living in the UK today (33%).

Figure 52. Critical Jewish learning experiences (N=4,891)




Question: Which, if any, of the following did you experience growing up? Responses as per chart.

To develop the analysis further, we calculated the mean number of experiences selected and analysed this by various subgroups. Overall, the mean number of critical Jewish educational experiences was 4.0 items. The mean was higher among Jewish men (4.7) than among Jewish women (3.9), mainly due to the far greater uptake of Bar Mitzvah compared with Bat Mitzvah between the sexes (Figure 54).

However, there is an important relationship between age and likelihood of having celebrated a Bar or Bat Mitzvah (Figure 53). While Bar Mitzvah is more common among males than Bat Mitzvah is among females, the gap has been closing steadily. The likelihood of girls having a Bat Mitzvah has increased over time, whereas males currently aged 16 to 39 are notably less likely to have experienced a Bar Mitzvah than older males.


Figure 53. Uptake of Bar and Bat Mitzvah by age group



Given the high uptake of Bar Mitzvah especially, this could explain the unusual age pattern we see in Figure 54. In general, the number of items experienced increases over time, i.e. the younger people are, the more items they are likely to have experienced. But this relationship ceases for those aged under fifty, where the average number of items experienced is the same for each age group (4.6 items).

All other variables indicate a close relationship between the average number of experiences and strength of Jewish identity and religiosity. In general, the more religious, Orthodox, engaged or attached people are, the more items they are likely to have experienced, on average. For example, people who are very attached to their local Jewish community have experienced 4.8 items on average, compared with 3.1 items among those who are not at all attached. Similarly, the more emotionally attached people feel to Israel, the more items they are likely to have experienced. The slight exception to this pattern is Jewish religious stream, whereby haredi Jews have experienced fewer items on average (5.0) than other Orthodox Jews (5.8 items), although this is unlikely to indicate that haredi Jews are doing less but rather, that they do a narrower range of the items listed.


Figure 54. Mean number of critical Jewish educational experiences growing up by various characteristics (N=4,891)



Jewish schooling

Jewish schooling in the UK has expanded significantly in recent decades.²⁰ It comprises two sectors: the non-haredi or ‘mainstream’ sector, which accounts for 40% of pupils and is mostly (85%) state funded, and the haredi sector, which comprises 60% of Jewish pupils and is mostly privately funded (87%).²¹ One in three (34%) Jewish adults attended a Jewish school for at least one stage (primary or secondary), and one in five (20%) attended a Jewish school for both stages (Figure 55).

Figure 55. Type of school attended by stage, Jewish population (N=4,891)



Question: Please tell us what type of school(s) you attended. If you moved type of school within a particular stage, please select where most of your time was spent during that stage. If you were educated abroad, please select the closest equivalent.


Jewish men are slightly more likely to have attended a Jewish school than Jewish women (37% v 32% respectively), but the most significant variable is age: younger Jews are far more likely to have attended a Jewish school than older Jews. This is especially the case in terms of having attended one at both the primary and secondary stage (Figure 56). Orthodox Jews are more likely to have attended a Jewish school than non-Orthodox Jews, a pattern which is also reflected in terms of religiosity. People who have attended a Jewish school are also more likely to be more connected to the Jewish community as synagogue members and in terms of their feelings of attachment, although one should be cautious about reading a causal relationship here. Whilst attending a Jewish school may well lead some to join synagogues in later life, children attending Jewish schools are also more likely to come from communally engaged families than those attending general schools.²²

20 Horup B., Lessof C., and Boyd J. (2021). *Numbers of Jewish children in Jewish schools - Statistical bulletin for 2018/19 to 2020/21*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, p.3.

21 Staetsky, D. and Boyd, J. (2016). *The rise and rise of Jewish schools in the United Kingdom. Numbers, trends and policy issues*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, p.13: "Whereas only 15% of all mainstream Jewish schools are independent, this is the case for 87% of the strictly Orthodox schools."

22 Graham, D. (2014). *Strengthening Jewish identity: What works? An analysis of Jewish identity among Jewish students in the UK*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.


Figure 56. Proportion who attended a Jewish school by stage, various characteristics (N=4,891)



Our analysis reveals that 45% of respondents with children (of any age) had sent at least one of them to a Jewish school. The younger Jewish parents are, the more likely it is they have sent/currently send their children to a Jewish school (Figure 57). We also see that the vast majority of Orthodox Jews send their children to a Jewish school, as do a majority of Traditional Jews (61%). Similarly, the more strongly religious a parent is, the more likely it is that they send/send their children to a Jewish school. More than half of parents who are synagogue members send/send their children to a Jewish school, compared with 15% of parents who do not belong to a synagogue. And there is a close relationship between communal attachment and choosing a Jewish school: the more closely attached a parent feels, the more likely it is they send/send their child to a Jewish school.

However, it is also the case that the more comfortable a parent’s economic circumstances are, the *less* likely it is that they choose a Jewish school for their child. One explanation for this is that most mainstream Jewish schools are state schools (non-fee paying), so parents who choose private education are almost always choosing non-Jewish schools, and only wealthier families can afford private school fees.

Figure 57. Proportion of parents who send/sent their children to a Jewish school (N=3,526 respondents who have had at least one child)




Question: *If you have any children, did you send them to a Jewish primary and/or secondary school?*

Jewish education in adulthood

Like learning in general, Jewish education is not limited to school and childhood. There are numerous communal opportunities to continue Jewish education throughout life, and the survey asked respondents whether they had recently participated in any adult Jewish learning, encompassing cultural, religious, linguistic and/or historical activities. Two out of five (40%) Jews said they had attended a public lecture on a Jewish topic (in person or online) in the previous twelve months, and 27% said they had attended Torah lessons or lectures (*shiurim*) (Figure 58).

Figure 58. Participation in adult Jewish learning activities (N=4,891)



Question: *And thinking about the past 12 months, have you participated in any of these specific activities, either in person or online?* Response options as per chart

Of the five learning activities listed, respondents were least likely to have participated in a Hebrew language programme or 'ulpan' (7%). However, certain groups were more likely to have done this than others: 12% of those aged 16 to 29, and 13% of Reform/Progressive respondents said they had done so in the previous twelve months (Figure 59). In general, respondents were rather more likely to have attended a course on Jewish history or culture (19%) than a Hebrew language programme, although, while Jewish men were more likely than women to have done this, Jewish women were more likely than men to have attended a Hebrew language programme. Younger respondents aged 16 to 29 were the most likely age band to have participated in a Jewish history or culture course (29%), and Reform/Progressive respondents were the most likely of the denominational streams to have done this (26%). However in terms of the more catch-all option of 'attending a public lecture on a Jewish topic' at some point in the previous twelve months, and indeed, as shown in Figure 60, participating in a Torah 'shiur' or lecture, we observe more familiar patterns, with the more religious and more Orthodox being the most likely to have done these. So, while engaged, non-Orthodox Jews are *more* likely to participate in Jewish *cultural* learning activities than Orthodox Jews, the extent to which they do so is dwarfed by the level of participation of the Orthodox in more religious learning activities.

Figure 59. Participation in (non-religious) adult Jewish learning activities, by various characteristics (N=4,891 per item)





Figure 60. Participation in (religious) adult Jewish learning activities, by various characteristics (N=4,891 per item)




/ Ethnic Jewish identity

Jewish halachic background

Jewish identity is as much about ethnicity as it is about religiosity and culture. According to traditional Jewish law (*halacha*), a person's status as a Jew is determined not by belief, but rather by the status of their mother – if the mother is Jewish, so is the child. Even among non-Orthodox bodies which extend this notion to include the father, the key principle is retained – one's Jewish status is passed on biologically, rather than through the adoption of a set of religious beliefs. And while conversion to Judaism is certainly permitted, it is not typically encouraged, and we see these realities reflected in the data. A clear majority (83%) of Jews in the UK have two Jewish parents, but respondents with one Jewish parent are twice as likely to have a Jewish mother than a Jewish father (8% Jewish mother v 4% Jewish father), a consequence of people with only a Jewish father being less likely to self-identify as Jewish (and by extension, to choose to participate in our survey) (Figure 61).

Although Judaism is not a proselytising religion, Jewish law does allow for non-Jewish people to convert. 5% of respondents said they were converts to Judaism, and as would be expected, most people within this group (64%) do not have a Jewish parent at all. However, we see again that among converts with one Jewish parent, almost twice as many have a Jewish mother as a Jewish father (17% Jewish mother v 9% Jewish father) (Figure 61).


Figure 61. Self-defined Jewish status and Jewish parental background (N=4,891)



Five percent of the adult Jewish population converted to Judaism, and compared with those who are Jewish by birth, converts are more likely to be female, more likely to have a younger age profile, and far less likely to be married (Figure 62). They are also far more likely to be aligned with the Reform/Progressive stream – 61% of converts are Reform/Progressive compared with 15% of Jews by birth – and, interestingly, they are more likely

to feel 'quite' or 'very' strongly religious than Jews by birth. Converts to Judaism are no more or less likely to feel attached to their local Jewish community, but they are more likely to feel that they are not accepted, although the proportions in this category, both among converts and Jews by birth, are small.

Figure 62. Demographic and Jewish identity characteristics of converts compared with Jews by birth (N=4,544 by birth, N=284 by conversion)



The majority (87%) of people who have converted to Judaism did so in the UK (Table 1). Of these people, almost half (46%) converted under the auspices of Reform Judaism and a further 29% under the auspices of Liberal Judaism. Conversion to Judaism via non-Orthodox routes tends to be less onerous than through Orthodox bodies, which probably explains why just one in six of all converts in the UK underwent an Orthodox conversion.

Table 1. Country and type of conversion to Judaism (N=284)

| Country conversion took place in | | UK conversion through | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|
| The UK | 87% | Orthodox | 17% |
| Israel | 1% | Masorti | 5% |
| The USA | 4% | Reform | 46% |
| Other country | 8% | Liberal | 29% |
| Total | 100% | Other | 2% |
| | | Total | 100% |


Jewish ethnicity

Most Jews in the UK claim one of two culturally distinct ethnic backgrounds based largely on their geographical heritage: Ashkenazim, originating from Northern and Eastern Europe, and Sephardim, from the Iberian Peninsula. In most regards today, there is little to differentiate Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews living in the UK, but there are still some differing religious and cultural customs, and there remains a small but distinct Sephardi (Spanish and Portuguese) synagogue movement in the country.²³ A majority of UK Jews (82%) identify as Ashkenazi, with just 5% identifying as Sephardi, 9% as mixed Jewish ethnicity, and 2% 'other'. A small proportion (2%) do not know their Jewish ethnic background (Figure 63).

There is a clear pattern in terms of age, with older Jews being more likely to identify as Ashkenazi than younger Jews. This is because the younger Jews are, the more likely they are to have Mixed heritage (rather than being Sephardi) (Figure 63). There were also 119 written responses to the 'Other' option in the question, of which 37% made reference to being a convert to Judaism.


23 Casale Mashiah, D. and Boyd, J. (2017), op. cit. The group accounts for 3% of synagogue members in the UK (p.11).

Figure 63. Jewish ethnicity by age (N=4,891)



Sephardi Jews are more likely than Ashkenazi Jews and those with Mixed backgrounds to have ‘quite’ or ‘very’ strong religiosity (Figure 64). Similarly, Sephardi Jews are more likely to self-describe as ‘Traditional’ and ‘Orthodox’ than Ashkenazi Jews, and less likely to identify as ‘non-practising’. We also see that Sephardi Jews are more strongly attached to Israel than Ashkenazi Jews, although this may be because Sephardi Jews are also more likely to hold an Israeli passport.

Figure 64. Jewish identity characteristics by Jewish ethnicity (Ashkenazi N=3,994; Sephardi N=243; Mixed N=432)



^ Holders of passports other than Israeli or British.

Jewish identity and Britishness

Respondents were asked to score the strength of their Jewish identity from 0 ('very low strength') to 10 ('very high strength'). Two out of five (40%) scored 10, and 55% scored 9 or 10. They were also asked the same question about the strength of their British identity, and in this case half as many (21%) scored 10 and 33% scored 9 or 10. In other words, in general, Jewish people report having a stronger Jewish identity than British identity.²⁴ Delving into this difference more deeply we can use the mean (average) scores on each scale, which were 8.3 for Jewish identity and 6.9 for British identity.

Jewish men have a slightly stronger British identity than Jewish women (7.1 v 6.7) but score identically with regard to their Jewish identity (both 8.3). The younger people are, the weaker their British identity, but the strength of Jewish identity is far less sensitive to age, with all age bands scoring very similarly (in the range of 8.0 to 8.5). Among older age groups (sixty years and above), the strength of Jewish and British identity is quite similar, but the gap widens as age decreases (Figure 65).

Strength of Jewish identity is closely associated with strength of religiosity: the stronger the religiosity, the higher the mean Jewish identity score, and vice versa. But a somewhat different relationship can be seen for British identity. It too increases along with religiosity (those with very strong religiosity have a somewhat stronger British identity than those with very weak religiosity), but nowhere near as sharply as Jewish identity. A similar pattern is seen in terms of emotional attachment to Israel. Among the most weakly attached, mean scores for Jewish and British identity strength are fairly similar, but the gap widens as feelings of attachment to Israel increase. That said, strength of British identity increases with attachment to Israel, suggesting that there is no evidence of a 'loyalty trade-off' among Jews in terms of their attachment to Israel and their British identity.

Finally, in terms of UK voting intentions, Conservative Party supporters have the highest mean score for British identity, and indeed for Jewish identity. By contrast, Green Party supporters have the lowest mean score both for British and for Jewish identity.


Beyond the absolute magnitude of the mean scores, it is noticeable that the size of the gap between the British and Jewish identity scores varies by category. Strength of Jewish and British identity is in greater harmony among older Jews, the less religious, those who are less committed to Israel, and those who support the Liberal Democratic and Conservative parties. By contrast, there is greater dissonance between Jewish and British identity among the young, the religious, those with stronger emotional attachment to Israel and those politically on the left.

While the two identity questions are posed ostensibly as if they are asking about different aspects of the same thing, they are not two sides of the same coin. One can have very strong feelings of identity on both scales without any contradiction. Moreover, with the

²⁴ Without equivalent data on how non-Jewish people in the UK regard their Britishness, it is difficult to contextualise this result, although other work has shown that Jews in the UK have slightly weaker feelings of attachment to their country than the general population. See: DellaPergola, S. and Staetsky, D. (2023). *Grounding Jewishness: How attached do Jews feel to Israel, Europe and the countries in which they live?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, p.4.

exception of the findings by age, even in cases where there is considerable dissonance between Jewish and British identity scores – for example, among those with Very or Quite strong religiosity – the weaker scores for British identity are still greater than the average (i.e. above 6.9), and as large as any other group on the religiosity scale.

Figure 65. Strength of Jewish and British identity by various characteristics (mean scores) (N=4,891 per item)




Question: Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 according to the strength of your Jewish identity, where 0 means 'very low strength' and 10 means 'very high strength'.

Question: Please position yourself on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 according to the strength of your British identity, where 0 means 'very low strength' and 10 means 'very high strength'.

Hebrew and Yiddish

Drawing on data from the 2021 Census of England and Wales, 94% of Jews in Britain speak English as their main language, and a further 5% report speaking English ‘well’ or ‘very well’.²⁵ But there are also a number of ‘Jewish languages’ that are spoken by some Jews in the UK, most importantly Hebrew, the language of Jewish prayer, the Bible and many traditional texts as well as the lingua franca of the modern State of Israel, and Yiddish, largely a cross between Hebrew and High German that was spoken by many Ashkenazi Jews in Eastern Europe up to the Second World War, and which remains common among haredi (strictly Orthodox) Jews today. Today, UK Jews are far more likely to be able to speak Hebrew than Yiddish. 7% of UK Jews speak Hebrew fluently and a further 15% speak a fair amount (Figure 66). By contrast, 2% of UK Jews speak Yiddish fluently and 5% speak a fair amount.²⁶

Figure 66. Ability to speak Hebrew and Yiddish (N=4,891 per item)




Question: Please tell us whether you can speak the following languages. Response option as shown in chart.

There are important differences between Hebrew and Yiddish speakers. Looking at data on those who speak a fair amount or speak the language fluently, we see that those aged in their thirties and forties are most likely to speak Hebrew, whereas it is those aged eighty or older who are most likely to speak Yiddish, as well as those aged in their twenties (Figure 67). In terms of denomination, both Haredi and Orthodox Jews are most likely to speak Hebrew, but it is Haredi Jews specifically who are most likely to speak Yiddish. This is reflected in the data on religiosity with the ‘very strongly’ religious being the most likely to speak either language. Unsurprisingly, three quarters of those holding an Israeli passport speak Hebrew fluently or a fair amount. Finally, attachment to Israel is also associated with the ability to speak Hebrew: those most closely attached are more likely to speak it. This relationship is not nearly so evident in terms of speaking Yiddish.

²⁵ Source: Office for National Statistics.

²⁶ The 2021 Census of England and Wales recorded 6,672 Hebrew speakers (2.5%) and 5,356 Yiddish speakers (2.0%). These counts were write-in answers to the question ‘What is your main language?’ This suggests Yiddish speakers may be undercounted in the survey. Source: Office for National Statistics.

Figure 67. Ability to speak Hebrew or Yiddish 'A fair amount' or 'Fluently' by various indicators




/ Jewish intermarriage and demography

Intermarriage in this context refers to the marriage of a Jewish person to a non-Jewish person. Overall, we found that 18% of married Jews in the UK have a non-Jewish spouse. This is known as the *prevalence* of intermarriage – i.e. the extent to which the entire married Jewish population has a non-Jewish spouse at this moment in time.²⁷ However, the prevalence of intermarriage varies considerably depending on which Jewish subgroup or demographic one examines.

The intermarriage rate

A key statistic in understanding intermarriage is what is known as the intermarriage *rate*, which refers to the proportion of Jewish people who married non-Jews in a particular period of time.²⁸ So, whilst the overall prevalence of intermarriage in the Jewish population as a whole is 18%, the intermarriage *rate* among those who got married since 2010 is 34%. In other words, of those Jews who got married between 2010 and 2022, one in three married someone not Jewish (Figure 68). This is considerably higher than the intermarriage rate for those who married between 2000 and 2009 (24%). Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 61, the intermarriage rate has been increasing over time, and seems to have increased rather significantly over the past three decades.

Figure 68. Proportion of married Jewish people with a non-Jewish spouse by period marriage took place (N=1,392)



Question: *Is your partner: Jewish by birth; Jewish by conversion; Not Jewish;*

Question: *In what year did your current, or most recent, marriage begin?*

27 In this section the intermarriage data have been calculated as follows. The base is unique households (i.e. married couples) rather than married Jewish individuals, in order to avoid the possibility that some in-married households could appear as duplicates (both members of the couple answered the survey). But all data are reported as married Jewish individuals, which is calculated by doubling the in-married counts.


28 All spouses who have converted to Judaism are included as Jews in these data.

Intermarriage and Jewish behaviour

Our data indicate that Jewish women are more likely to be intermarried than Jewish men (21% women v 14% men) (Figure 69). This is in line with several other findings here showing Jewish men tend to be rather more religiously observant than Jewish women (e.g. see Figure 15), but it is also affected by Jewish status issues – according to *halacha* (Jewish law) the child of a Jewish woman will be Jewish regardless of the religion of the father, whereas that is not the case for the child of a Jewish man.

Whilst no Orthodox or haredi Jews are intermarried,²⁹ almost half (48%) of secular/cultural Jews are. At 3% intermarried, Traditional Jews behave much more like Orthodox Jews than Reform/Progressive Jews in this respect (Figure 69).


Figure 69. Prevalence of intermarriage by sex and denominational stream (N=1,421)



In terms of behavioural traits, intermarried Jews are far more weakly connected to Jewish life. For example, compared with in-married Jews, they are far less likely to belong to a synagogue, and far less likely to only eat kosher meat outside the home, donate to Jewish charities, or to say half or more of their friends are Jewish (Figure 70). Intermarried Jews are also much less likely to fast on Yom Kippur or to light Chanukah candles every year, and almost half (45%) decorate their homes with a Christmas tree every year. On the other hand, intermarried Jews are rather more likely than in-married Jews to donate to non-Jewish charities.

²⁹ While the NJIS sample did not record anyone who identified as Orthodox or haredi as being intermarried, it is possible that some people in these groups are, although the numbers would be extremely small.

Figure 70. Prevalence of intermarriage by various indicators of Jewish belonging and behaviour (N=1,421)



/ Israel attachment and Zionism

Our data on Israel and Zionism were gathered before the war between Israel and Hamas which was ongoing at the time of writing this report at the end of 2023. The war was prompted by a barbaric attack on Israel on 7th October 2023, the Jewish festival of *Simchat Torah*, in which over 1,200 Israelis and other foreign nationals were murdered, mostly civilians, and about 240 were abducted. The ensuing war had a devastating effect on both the Israeli and Palestinian populations. Its reverberations throughout the Jewish Diaspora, including in the UK, were also ongoing at the time of writing. As we have seen following other flare-ups involving Israel over the previous decade-and-a-half, the war was associated with a parallel spike in antisemitic incidents in the UK, which caused widespread anxiety and concern.³⁰ Moreover, it is highly likely that this war has had an impact on Jewish people's perspectives of Zionism and/or attachment to Israel, at least in the short to medium term. Therefore, these findings, which were collected in December 2022, ten months earlier and during a relatively peaceful period in Israel, should be viewed as a snapshot of UK Jewish opinion on the eve of that war. In the future, JPR will measure how this conflict has altered British attitudes and attachments to Israel by continuing to monitor the Jewish and non-Jewish UK population.

Zionism


In gathering our data, we were interested to understand how Jews use the political term 'Zionist', so we presented respondents with a question that acknowledged the contested nature of the term, but nevertheless asked them to say whether or not they considered themselves to be one. 63% of respondents self-identified as Zionist. To contextualise this figure, the last time UK Jews were asked this question, in 2010, 72% self-described as Zionist (Figure 71).³¹ This question has also been posed recently to Jews in other Anglo-Jewish communities; in 2019, 69% of Jews in South Africa said they were Zionist, and in 2017, 69% of Jews in Australia did.³² Thus, 63% for our measurement of UK Jews prior to 7 October 2023 marks quite a significant decline in Zionist identification over the past decade or so and is also a relatively low figure compared to similar communities worldwide, albeit based on data from a few years earlier.

30 For example, following a conflict in May 2021, JPR asked UK Jews about their experiences. See: Graham, D., and Boyd, J. (2023). *Conflict in Israel and Gaza: What do Jews in the UK think?* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

31 Graham, D. and Boyd, J. (2010). *Committed, concerned and conciliatory: The attitudes of Jews in Britain towards Israel. Initial findings from the 2010 Israel Survey.* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, p.12.


32 Graham, D. (2020). *The Jews of South Africa in 2019: Identity, community, society, demography.* London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, and Cape Town: The Isaac and Jessie Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research, University of Cape Town; Graham, D. and Markus, A. (2018). *Gen17 Australian Jewish Community Survey, Preliminary findings.* Sydney: JCA, and Melbourne: Monash University.

Figure 71. Are you a Zionist? (NJIS 2022: N=4,891; JPR Israel Survey 2010: N=4,066)



NJIS offered all those who did not self-define as Zionist (37%) four alternative response options to the question. The aim was to develop a greater understanding of how UK Jews saw themselves in this regard at the time the data were gathered, beyond a binary distinction between being a Zionist and not being one. This revealed that 8% of Jews overall self-described as ‘anti-Zionist,’ whilst about twice as many (15%) defined themselves as ‘non-Zionist’ (Figure 72). A further 9% of Jews felt unable to answer this question, and a small proportion (4%) said they were ‘not sure what Zionism means.’ Among the 170 people who ticked ‘Other,’ many commented on the questionnaire that they felt ‘conflicted’ about using the term, often emphasising that despite not wanting to identify as a Zionist, they nevertheless believed in Israel’s right to exist. Among their responses, they said:

- *I am conflicted about whether I feel Zionist anymore;*
- *I believe in Israel’s right to exist;*
- *I don’t care for the term, but I support Israel, not necessarily the present government;*
- *I don’t like what the term implies in 2022;*
- *I find comfort in the existence of a Jewish state, but feel that identifying as a Zionist implies support for the increasingly oppressive actions of a near-apartheid state;*
- *I support Israel and the right to be there, but I feel Zionism has a slightly aggressive prejudiced feel about it;*
- *I support the existence of the State of Israel but I would not call myself a Zionist because I do not like many things about the State of Israel;*
- *It is too complicated a situation for me to decide, but I am not anti-Zionism [sic].*

Figure 72. Are you a Zionist? (N=4,891)


Question: *Although there are different opinions about what the term Zionism means, in general, do you consider yourself to be a Zionist?*

Question: *You said you do not consider yourself to be a Zionist or do not know if you are. Which of the following is closest to your position? Response options: I am an anti-Zionist; I am a non-Zionist; I am not sure what Zionism means; Don't know.*

To get a clearer understanding of the types of Jewish people that do (and do not) subscribe to the term Zionist, we examined an array of variables. In terms of age, those most likely to identify as Zionist are in the middle age-bands, especially people aged in their fifties (78%). We see a distinct falloff in Zionist identification on either side of this age band: 57% of those in their twenties self-describe as Zionist, a similar proportion to those in their seventies (58%). As expected, the vast majority of Jews who prioritise their donations to Israel charities are Zionist (90%), but this is the case for a minority (43%) of Jews who prioritise aid for the poor in other countries (Figure 73). In terms of religiosity, the most religious are not the most Zionist, but neither are they the least Zionist: the most likely to call themselves Zionist are people with 'quite strong' religiosity (76%) and the least likely are those with 'very weak' religiosity (44%). However, whilst there is a correlation between Orthodoxy/religiosity and the likelihood of being Zionist, the picture is rather more complex: the least likely are the strictly Orthodox (31%), but the most likely are the Orthodox (90%).

Finally, given the political nature of the term, it is not surprising to find differences of opinion based on UK political leaning. Conservative supporters are the most likely to identify as Zionist (73%), and Green Party supporters are the least (26%). Note, however, that although Labour supporters are less likely than Conservative supporters to say they are Zionist, they are still much closer to the Conservatives than the Greens.

Figure 73. Who says they are Zionist? (N=4,891)




Israel attachment

A large majority (88%) of Jewish adults in Britain have been to Israel. 17% have lived there and a further 71% have visited Israel at least once but not lived there. Just 12% have never visited Israel. Respondents were also asked about their levels of emotional attachment to Israel, and we found that two out of five (41%) feel ‘very attached’, and a further third (32%) feel ‘somewhat attached’. Thus, more respondents feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ emotionally attached to Israel (73%) than say they are Zionists (63%). It is also noteworthy that British Jews feel more attached to Israel than do American Jews – according to the 2020 Pew survey of Jews in the United States, just 58% of American Jews feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ emotionally attached to Israel,³³ fifteen percentage points lower than Jews in the UK.

33 Net Jewish figures – Pew 2021, op. cit. p.139.

Whilst the vast majority of Zionist Jews (91%) feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ emotionally attached to Israel, among the 37% of Jews who do not call themselves Zionist, two groups can be broadly identified (Figure 74). First, the anti-Zionists who, as was noted above, constitute about 8% of the population, among whom just 14% feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ emotionally attached to Israel, and 70% feel no emotional attachment to Israel at all. Yet among the remainder – i.e. the non-Zionists, those who are not sure, and the ‘Others’ – around half feel ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ emotionally attached to Israel.

Figure 74. Emotional attachment to Israel by whether or not Zionist (N=4,891)




Question: *How emotionally attached are you to Israel?* Response options as per chart.

Emotional attachment to Israel broadly increases with age, although for those aged forty and above, the pattern is not smooth (Figure 75). Jewish men are slightly more emotionally attached to Israel than Jewish women. Having personal experience of visiting Israel is closely related to emotional attachment, with more frequent visits associated with greater attachment. While it is tempting to think that this is a causal relationship – and it may well be – we cannot say this definitively without further analysis.

Religiosity is also very closely related to Israel attachment: the stronger the level of religiosity, the stronger the level of emotional attachment to Israel. The same pattern can be observed regarding denominational stream. This, however, can be contrasted with the above findings about being Zionist which show that strictly Orthodox Jews, despite being highly emotionally attached to Israel, are far less likely to identify with the term Zionist (Figure 73). This highlights the fact that attachment to Israel and being Zionist are not necessarily reflective of the same type of identity, although clearly, there is considerable overlap.


A reversal of this finding can be seen in terms of UK political leaning. Where Labour and Conservative supporters are not too far apart on being Zionist (59% v 73% respectively, Figure 73), Labour supporters trail far behind Conservative supporters when it comes to emotional attachment to Israel (64% v 90% respectively, Figure 75). Again, we can see that being a Zionist and feeling emotionally attached to Israel are, for at least some Jews, distinct concepts.

Figure 75. Proportion of those who say they are Very or Somewhat emotionally attached to Israel, by various characteristics (N=4,891)



In December 2022, respondents were more likely to say that the Diaspora is ‘necessary for the long-term survival of the Jewish People’ than they were to make the same claim about a Jewish State. The vast majority (89%) said that the Diaspora is ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ necessary, compared with a lower proportion (76%) who said that a Jewish state is ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ necessary (Figure 76). Overall, 37% said that both entities are definitely necessary, and 69% said both are probably or definitely necessary. It is possible, indeed likely, that the Israel-Hamas war has altered people’s thinking in this regard, and future research will allow us to assess this empirically.

Figure 76. Is the Diaspora and a Jewish State necessary for the long-term survival of the Jewish people? (N=4,891 for each item)




Aliyah (migration to Israel)

When respondents were asked how likely it is they would ‘make *aliyah*’ – i.e. live permanently in Israel – in the next five years, over half (52%) said it was ‘extremely unlikely’, i.e. they scored 0 on a scale from 0 to 10. In fact, just 10% scored in the ‘more likely than less’ range (i.e. 6–10).³⁴ To understand who is more or less likely to consider making aliyah, we can take the mean score for the Jewish population as a whole (1.8) and compare it with different variables. For example, younger Jews were more likely to say it was a possibility than older Jews (Figure 77). Overall, Jews who were more religious and more Orthodox were more likely to think they would move to Israel in the coming five years than those who were less religious and less Orthodox, and those who were more Zionist, more emotionally attached and more frequent visitors to Israel were more likely to as well. But we can also see in Figure 77 that Jews who did not ‘feel safe as a Jewish person living in the UK’ or who had experienced an antisemitic incident, were notably more likely to consider making aliyah than others.

34 Israel Central Bureau of Statistics data demonstrate that the actual number of Jews from the UK who have made aliyah each year since 2000 has been in the 300 to 700 range – i.e. about 0.1% to 0.2% of the UK Jewish population – indicating that there is a considerable difference between saying it is likely, and actually taking the step.

Figure 77. How likely, if at all, is it that you will live permanently in Israel ('make *aliyah*') in the next five years, where 0 is 'Extremely unlikely' and 10 is 'Extremely likely' – mean scores by sub group




/ Employment and volunteering in the Jewish community

Working in the Jewish community

For some people, their involvement in Jewish life extends into their work life. We were interested to find out what proportion of Jews work in some way for the Jewish community, either through a Jewish organisation or through working predominantly with or for Jewish clients. In total, 25% of working Jewish people said they work for the Jewish community or have mainly Jewish clients. 18% of respondents work for a Jewish organisation, 9% work for an organisation that provides services to the Jewish community, and 8% work for an organisation, most or all of whose customers/clients are Jewish (Figure 78).


Figure 78. Proportion of Jews who work for the Jewish community directly or indirectly (N=2,335)



Question: *In your main job, do you* [response options as per chart].

Jewish people who devote their working life to Jewish organisations are far more likely to be female (23%) than male (14%), and it is more common among younger than older Jews (Figure 79). The Orthodox are far more likely to do so than other Jewish streams and consequently, we see that 40% of the very strongly religious do so, indicating that for many, Jewish identity and engagement extend far beyond religious and cultural involvement.

Figure 79. Jewish people who ‘Work for a Jewish organisation’ by various characteristics (N=2,335)




Volunteering in and beyond the Jewish community

Respondents were asked if they had done any type of unpaid voluntary work in the previous twelve months, whether for a Jewish community organisation or a non-Jewish charity. Overall, 72% of Jews said they had volunteered for either a Jewish or a non-Jewish organisation, and they were more likely to have volunteered for a Jewish organisation (57%) than a non-Jewish one (46%).

In terms of the Jewish sector, almost one in three (31%) had volunteered for synagogue-related activities. This may well account for the higher likelihood of Jews volunteering for Jewish organisations than non-Jewish organisations, since there is no equivalent category for Jews in the non-Jewish sector (Figure 80). The data reveal other differences too. In three areas, Jews are rather more likely to engage in volunteering within the Jewish community than outside of it: care for the elderly; youth/children’s activities outside school; and education for adults. But there are also three areas where Jews are more likely to engage in volunteering outside the Jewish community than within it: environment, conservation and/or animal rights; justice and human rights; and political activities.

Figure 80. Proportion of Jews who carried out unpaid voluntary work in the previous 12 months by sector (N=4,891 for each bar)




Question: *In the last 12 months which, if any, of the following types of unpaid voluntary work have you done for a Jewish community organisation/group?* Response options as per chart.

Question: *And in the last 12 months which, if any, of the following types of unpaid voluntary work have you done for a non-Jewish community organisation/group?* Response options as per chart.

Jewish men are more likely to volunteer than Jewish women overall, and they are also more likely to do so within the Jewish community, whereas Jewish women are more likely to do so outside the community (Figure 81). In terms of age, volunteering within the community is more likely in the middle age groups, whereas volunteering outside the Jewish community is more common among the youngest and oldest ones. There is also a contrast in terms of Jewish denomination, with Jews who are associated with the more orthodox streams being the most likely to volunteer in the Jewish community, but the least likely to do so outside the Jewish community. This pattern is also repeated in terms of religiosity. In other words, while less religious Jews tend to do less volunteering overall, they are more likely than more religious Jews to volunteer outside the Jewish community. Finally, we see no relationship between people's economic circumstances and volunteering, suggesting that the propensity to volunteer is predominantly driven by factors such as religiosity and age.

Figure 81. Volunteering within and outside the Jewish community by various characteristics (N=4,891 for each bar)



/ Charitable giving


Charitable giving is another important aspect of Jewish identity. Indeed, as we saw earlier (Figure 13), 84% of Jews said that 'donating funds to charity' was very or somewhat important to their Jewish identity. In this section we explore the nature of Jewish charitable giving, and quantify the amounts that Jews give.

Charitable priorities

In order to understand the types of causes that Jewish people prioritise when making a charitable donation, respondents were presented with a list of four overarching categories (plus 'Other') and asked which one they prioritised most highly. Of these, the cause they were most likely to prioritise was 'Jewish charities in the UK' (43%), followed by 'General charities in the UK' (31%) (Figure 82).

When JPR posed this question in 2013, we observed slightly different responses. While the top priority was also Jewish charities in the UK, only 33% placed it there at that time (Figure 82). This implies that there has been a shift towards Jewish charities and away from others over the past decade. Of particular interest is the decline in prioritising Israel, down from 9% in 2013 to 5% in 2022, although again, it is important to note that this result was obtained prior to the Israel-Hamas war which began on 7 October 2023. It is highly likely that people's propensity to support Israel charities increased in response to the war, although whether that will reflect a lasting shift in priorities is impossible to determine at this time.

Figure 82. Highest priority for charitable giving: 2013 compared with 2022 (N=3,736, N=4,891 respectively)




Question: *To which of the following, if any, do you give the highest priority?* Response options as per chart.

Together, these two highest charitable priorities – Jewish and general charities in the UK – account for three quarters of the total, but there are notable differences between those who prioritise Jewish charities in the UK and those who prioritise general (i.e. not Jewish) charities in the UK. For example, Jewish men are more likely to prioritise Jewish charities, and Jewish women are more likely to prioritise general charities (Figure 83). In terms of age, only one group, those aged 16 to 19, were more likely to prioritise general charities over Jewish charities, although for those aged in their twenties, there is almost no difference. But for all other age groups, Jewish charities in the UK are much more likely to be prioritised.

There is a very strong relationship between Jewish denomination and charitable priorities. The more Orthodox the respondents are, the more likely they are to prioritise Jewish charities in the UK. In no case did more than 48% of any group prioritise general UK charities. The same pattern is seen in terms of religiosity. Unsurprisingly, the more closely attached people are to Israel, the more likely they are to prioritise Israel charities (not shown), but it is also the case that the greater the level of Israel attachment, the more likely it is that Jewish charities in the UK are prioritised rather than general charities in the UK.

Figure 83. Highest priority for charitable giving by various characteristics




Donations made

In the 2021 calendar year, the vast majority (89%) of respondents had made a donation to a Jewish or non-Jewish charity. Respondents were asked how much they had donated in total in that year and to provide an exact value.³⁵ There are different ways to assess these data, but the first approach is to use the mode – i.e. the value that was most often recorded – which was £100. However, this is not the average, or mean value, which was far higher at £2,042, although the mean is notoriously affected by outliers, in this case a relatively small number of people who reported especially large amounts. Therefore, a third value is the median, the amount that splits the sample exactly in two, whereby half of donations are smaller and half are larger. The median donation was £300. (It is worth noting that these values are based on individuals, but donations can be made by families. When we recalculate these figures to only include unique households – and therefore avoid any possible double counting – we find the mean household donation is £2,218 and the median is £400).

Respondents were also asked what proportion of their charitable contributions were given to Jewish charities. The distribution shown in Figure 84 indicates that almost half (49%) gave more than half of their donations to Jewish charities, whereas 9% gave all and 12% gave none.

Figure 84. Proportion of total charitable donations given in 2021 to Jewish charities (N=4,484)




Question: *Considering the total amount you donated to charity in 2021, approximately what percentage did you give to Jewish charities?* Response options: 0–100%

A similar, though not identical*, question was asked by JPR in NJCS 2013, which found that 36% said that they had given more than half of their donations to Jewish charities (Figure 85). A notably higher proportion of charitable donations was given to Jewish charities in 2022 than in 2013.

³⁵ N=2560. The question asked was: 'How much money in total did you donate to Jewish and/or non-Jewish charities in the calendar year 2021? Please do not include synagogue membership fees or voluntary contributions to Jewish schools. Please do include any donations made through a business or family foundation. If you cannot recall an exact amount, please estimate.'


Figure 85. Proportion of total charitable donations given to Jewish charities: 2013 compared with 2022 (N=3,170* and N=4,484 respectively)



* In NJIS an exact percentage value was required, whereas in 2013, NJCS asked: *Approximately what proportion of these charitable donations you gave over the past 12 months went to Jewish charities? If you are unsure, please estimate.* Response options: *None; Less than half; About half; More than half; All.* We believe this comparison is valid at the level presented, although the different ways the questions were asked appears to have encouraged fewer people to report None/0% in 2022 (29% in 2013 v 12% in 2022).

There is an interesting relationship between the total amount given and the proportion of that total that is given to Jewish charities. In general, the larger the total amount donated over the course of the year, the higher the proportion that is donated to Jewish charities (Figure 86).

Figure 86. Relationship between total amount donated and proportion of the total that is given to Jewish charities (N=4,450)




Looking at those who donated £500 or more (to any charity) in the calendar year 2021, we see that Jewish men were rather more likely to do so than Jewish women (47% v 32%) (Figure 87). Jewish men were also more likely than Jewish women to give more than half of these donations to Jewish charities. Given that income increases with age, it is not surprising that the proportion who gave over £500 also increases with age, up to the sixties. Younger Jews are less likely to give half or more of their donations to Jewish charities than those aged forty and above.

In terms of Jewish identity, the more Orthodox the respondents are, the more likely they were to donate £500 or more to charity in 2021. For example, this was the case for 63% of Orthodox respondents, compared with 34% of Reform/Progressive Jews. The same pattern holds for religiosity. It is also the case that the more Orthodox the respondents are, the higher the proportion of their total given was directed towards Jewish charities. 87% of Haredi Jews donated over half of their total donations to Jewish charities, compared with 32% of Reform/Progressive Jews and 17% of secular-cultural Jews.

We would expect to see a relationship between the total amount people donate and their economic circumstances, and indeed this is the case. Those who feel worse off are less likely to give £500 or more to charity. However, people’s economic circumstances are essentially unrelated to the proportion of the total donations that they make to Jewish charities (Figure 87).

Figure 87. Proportion who donated over £500 in total, and proportion who donated over 50% of their total donations (any amount) to Jewish charities, by various characteristics (N=4,450 and N=4,484 respectively*)




* Excluding 'Don't know' and 'Prefer not to say' responses to amount donated.

/ Antisemitism and Jewish identity

During the first Israel-Hamas war in 2009, and the subsequent wars in 2014, 2021 and 2023, parallel spikes in antisemitism were clearly observed both in the UK and elsewhere.³⁶ In our survey (conducted in 2022), respondents were asked whether they had experienced any antisemitic incidents in the 2021 calendar year – i.e. in a year when one of these flare-ups took place (May 2021)³⁷ – so this may have impacted data on experiences of antisemitism presented here.

Overall, 32% of adult Jews had personally experienced at least one type of antisemitic incident in 2021. The most common form of antisemitism that Jewish people experienced in 2021 was spoken, with 14% reporting they had experienced ‘A verbal antisemitic attack’ (Figure 88). Just over one in ten (11%) had experienced ‘Online antisemitic abuse or harassment directed at you personally’. Experience of more serious physical antisemitic attacks was far less likely, with under 1% of Jews reporting this.

Figure 88. Experience of antisemitism in 2021 (N=4,891)



Question: *Thinking about your experiences in the calendar year 2021, did you personally experience any type of antisemitic incident(s) directed at you because you are Jewish?* Response options as per chart.

Antisemitism is not experienced by all Jewish people equally – some sub-groups are far more likely to experience it than others. For example, Jews under thirty are far more likely than others to experience a verbal antisemitic attack than older Jewish people: this was the case for almost two out of five (39%) Jews aged 16 to 19, compared with 11% of Jews in or around their parents’ age bracket (50 to 59 years old) (Figure 89). Haredi Jews are also far more likely to have experienced a verbal antisemitic attack (also 39%), presumably because they are more visibly Jewish than less orthodox Jews. Similarly, Jews with ‘very strong’ religiosity are also far more likely to have experienced this (29%).


36 For example, see: CST (2023). *Antisemitic Incidents January-June 2023*; CST (2021). *The month of hate: Antisemitism and extremism during the Israel-Gaza conflict*.

37 Graham, D. and Boyd, J. (2023). *Conflict in Israel and Gaza: Heightened feelings of insecurity among Jews in the UK*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

It is also the case that emotional attachment to Israel is associated with experience of verbal antisemitism. This may be because those who are more attached to Israel are more likely than others to engage in political discourse about Israel, and perhaps more likely to interpret criticism of Israel as antisemitism.

Finally, students are far more likely to have experienced a verbal antisemitic attack (35%) than Jews who are employed (17%) or are retired (4%). Part of the reason is the association between age and experience of antisemitism, but it may also be the case that antisemitism is a growing issue in academia in general – certainly, there is some evidence to suggest that Jewish people studying or working in an academic environment are rather likely to experience antisemitism there, although more detailed analysis is needed to fully understand this.³⁸

Figure 89. Experienced a verbal antisemitic attack in 2021 by various characteristics (N=4,890)




38 The 2018 FRA survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews, conducted by a JPR/Ipsos team, found that 39% of European Jews aged 16–29 said they been exposed to negative statements about Jews in the previous year ‘in academia,’ as did 20–21% of those aged 30–59, and 17% of older respondents. In general, Jews living in the UK were more likely to report this than European Jews as a whole. See: FRA (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights) (2018). *Experiences and perceptions of antisemitism. Second survey on discrimination and hate crime against Jews in the EU*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union (Publications Office).

/ Jewish identity and happiness

Using standard measures of mental wellbeing we can assess whether there is a relationship between happiness and religiosity. Studies have found that such a relationship does exist, showing that people who are part of communities are, on average, happier than those who have fewer types of communal and interpersonal connections.³⁹ In our data* we find that the stronger a person's religiosity, the higher they score on scales measuring life satisfaction and happiness. For example, respondents were asked how happy they felt 'yesterday' on a scale from 0 (not at all happy) to 10 (completely happy). On average, those with 'very weak' religiosity scored 6.9, whereas those with 'very strong' religiosity scored a mean of 8.0 (Figure 90).

Figure 90. Relationship between happiness and religiosity (N=4,149 for each variable) (JPR Panel wave 2*)




Question: For each of these questions please give an answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is 'not at all' and 10 is 'completely.' Overall, how satisfied are you with your life nowadays? Overall, how happy did you feel yesterday?
* Authors' calculations using data from the second wave (w2) of JPR's panel, fielded between 23 July 2021 and 1 September 2021.

However, the relationship is not simply to do with belief; it is also associated with belonging, as the literature has shown. In Figure 91 we can see that people who are not at all attached to a Jewish community achieve a mean score of 6.4 on the happiness scale, compared with 7.7 for those who are strongly attached to a Jewish community. The same pattern can be seen in terms of life satisfaction: those with stronger feelings of attachment to the Jewish community have greater levels of life satisfaction than those with weaker feelings of attachment. According to the Pew Research Center,

39 Pew Research Center, 2019, *Religion's Relationship to Happiness, Civic Engagement and Health Around the World*; Waldinger, MD., and Schulz, M. (2023). *The Good Life: Lessons from the World's Longest Scientific Study of Happiness* (Rider), also shows this with respect to interpersonal relationships.

“Prior research suggests that one factor may be particularly important: The social connections that come with regular participation in group events,” and in their list of such events, they mention ‘weekly worship services’ and ‘Sabbath dinners’.⁴⁰

Figure 91. Relationship between happiness and Jewish communal attachment* (N=4,149)



* Authors' calculations using data from the second wave (w2) of JPR's panel, fielded between 23 July 2021 and 1 September 2021.

40 For further discussion on this see Pew 2019, op. cit. p.12.

/ Methodology

Dr Carli Lessof

Scope

This appendix presents key information about the 2022 National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS), the main source of data in this report. Unlike the stand-alone JPR surveys of the past, this survey was implemented as part of the third wave of the JPR Research Panel, so this appendix begins by outlining the development and key methodological aspects of the Panel, as this underpins the NJIS survey methodology. NJIS was also designed to facilitate future comparison with expressions of contemporary Jewish identity collected almost a decade earlier, through the 2013 National Jewish Community Survey (NJCS).⁴¹

Placing the 2022 National Jewish Identity Survey within the JPR Research Panel

Historically, random probability sampling has been considered the gold standard of survey methodology. However, it is very difficult to use this approach to survey Jews, or indeed any minority religious or ethnic group in the UK, as there is no suitable sample frame from which to select potential participants. Attempts to overcome the lack of sample frame are costly and bring their own challenges⁴² and surveys of Jews and other minority groups in the UK now tend to rely on building self-selecting samples and adjusting responses to ensure that they are as representative as possible.⁴³

JPR has considerable experience implementing this approach, carrying out a number of studies of this kind.⁴⁴ The primary method of building the samples for these surveys has been to ask a set of 'seed' organisations drawn from a broad cross-section of the Jewish community to invite their members or distribution lists to participate.⁴⁵ Each survey can then be completed by any individual who confirms that they are aged 16 or over, lives

41 More detailed information about NJCS can be found in Appendix A of: Graham, D., Staetsky, L.D. and Boyd, J. (2014). *Jews in the United Kingdom in 2013: Preliminary findings from the National Jewish Community Survey*. London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research.

42 Most importantly, the UK does not have a Population Register. Doorstep screening to boost ethnic or religious minority samples is prohibitively expensive given the low density of Jews in the UK. Random Digit Dialling, which was popular at one time, is also too costly and has many potential drawbacks, which have been exacerbated by the growth of mobile phone use.

43 The case for non-random probability methods for gathering data about ethnic and religious minority groups has been made by a large-scale national survey, the Evidence for Equality National Survey (EVENS) study, carried out in 2021 by the Centre on the Dynamics of Ethnicity, and by extensive work carried out within JPR on FRA surveys (2012 and 2018).

44 In addition to NJCS, JPR has carried out Europe-wide surveys for the European Union. See for example, FRA 2012 and 2018.

45 For example, NJCS used the email lists of more than 20 seed organisations, including media and synagogal organisations, Jewish online networks and key community representative organisations.

in the United Kingdom and self-identifies as Jewish in any way. Survey data are collected using an online self-completion questionnaire. This is an efficient and cost-effective approach, and in general, response is good, although three groups, the under forties, those less engaged in the Jewish community, and members of the strictly Orthodox or 'haredi' community, tend to be underrepresented. As a result, responses are weighted to ensure that the composition of the analytical sample reflects the known characteristics of the Jewish community based on a set of baselines gathered from the national census carried out by the Office for National Statistics (including data on religion, age, sex and location of residence) and communal survey information about synagogue membership.

However, building the sample for these studies is time consuming and relies on the willingness of partner organisations to promote the survey to their membership lists. In the past, each time a new survey took place, a fresh sample was drawn, making the task more burdensome. Furthermore, survey implementation and delivery was commissioned from professional research and polling agencies. In combination, these factors imposed a practical limit on the number of surveys that JPR was able to carry out.

As an alternative, JPR decided to invest in an approach taken by many large survey research organisations, which is to build a standing panel of survey respondents who are willing to be revisited over time. This has several advantages. Invitations and reminders can be sent with relative ease directly to individuals who have previously participated in a survey. Although all panels suffer from attrition, good response rates can be achieved from at least a core of committed panel members. This makes it possible to shift recruitment efforts at each wave to building the sample of the underrepresented groups mentioned earlier, who are less likely to participate and more likely to attrit. This can be achieved by focusing recruitment efforts on organisations who engage best with these underrepresented groups, and by investing in new methods of recruitment such as social media campaigns. Overall, a panel approach can make it possible to deliver surveys faster and in a more responsive way, reducing both survey turn-around times and the marginal cost of additional surveys, although it is important to acknowledge that maintaining the panel introduces its own ongoing costs. Perhaps of greatest importance, a panel has certain benefits for analysis: it can facilitate a more consistent weighting strategy and it creates the possibility of tracking change in individual's behaviours and attitudes over time.

Work on the JPR Research Panel began in late 2019. The timetable for this was accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which introduced an urgent need for a survey assessing the impact of the disease and of lockdown on Jews in the UK. As a result, when JPR launched a survey about Jewish experiences of COVID-19, respondents were also invited to join the Panel. Survey fieldwork took place between 9th and 31st July 2020. A total of 6,983 individuals took part, which constituted the first wave of the panel (w1). Of these, 67.4% (n= 4,704) agreed to join the panel, 14.4% (n= 1,003) agreed to a single follow-up invitation and 18.3% (n=1,276) completed the survey but were not willing to be recontacted. Approximately a year later, a second wave follow-up survey, referred to as w2, was conducted to understand the continuing impact of COVID-19. This took place between 22nd July and 31st August 2021 and 4,314 respondents responded. The majority of these were, by design, existing panel members, but the survey also incorporated 625 new panellists. The third wave (or w3) of the JPR Research Panel was the 2022 National Jewish Identity Survey (NJIS) which is described here. Fieldwork took place between 16th November and 23rd December 2022, with 4,907 taking part.

All aspects of the panel and its constituent surveys are developed, implemented, analysed and reported in-house at JPR. The panel and its component surveys are delivered using specialist, secure software provided by Forsta, and additional support for data management and weighting is provided by ZK Analytics. Throughout, analysis of the panel and survey data has been carried out using SPSS, while weighting has been carried out using R.

In summary, NJIS was delivered as part of the third wave of the JPR Research Panel. It is a survey of 4,907 individuals aged 16 or over, who live in the United Kingdom and who self-identify as Jewish in any way.

Questionnaire development

NJIS replicated many of the questions from NJCS, which was developed to investigate Jewish identity almost a decade earlier, so that future comparison of the two studies would be possible.⁴⁶ However, some questions were dropped or altered to reduce interview length, and some additions and alterations were made to reflect social changes over time.

The questionnaire was tested in-house to minimise errors and improve the flow. Where possible, filtering, range checks and soft checks were introduced to reduce data entry errors or illogical responses. Given that many of the questions had been fielded successfully in 2013, newer elements of the questionnaire were tested using cognitive interviews with seven individuals, who were each given a £20 voucher to thank them for their time. Further checks were carried out early in the fieldwork period, including a review of all respondent feedback offered by email, telephone or entered in the open text question at the end of the survey. The full dataset was checked during fieldwork and at the end of data collection.

Subsequent fieldwork showed that the average (median) length of time taken to complete the questionnaire was 28 minutes,⁴⁷ with a quarter of participants completing the survey in less than 22 minutes, and a quarter taking 41 minutes or more. Some of these longer durations may reflect the fact that the survey software allowed people to take breaks and return to the task. Indeed, 9.3% of respondents did not complete the survey on the day they first clicked on their survey link. It is also important to note that a small number of additional questions were included in the questionnaire for other research purposes, but which were not part of NJIS. This means that the reported interview length does not solely reflect the time taken to complete the NJIS questions reported in this study.

46 In that case, questions were drawn from a range of JPR and national surveys, and questionnaire development involved extensive consultation through a project Steering Group (see Graham, Staetsky and Boyd, Appendix 3, p.45).

47 This is similar to the average length of time spent completing the NJCS questionnaire in 2013, which was 31 minutes.

Methods of recruitment

The main method of recruitment to NJIS was through the existing members of the JPR Research Panel, who were directly invited to participate in the survey. At the start of fieldwork, an initial email invitation was issued to all panel members, followed by up to four email reminders. Respondents who had provided a mobile telephone number when registering for the panel received one less email reminder, instead receiving up to two SMS reminders. Later reminders (whether by email or SMS) were tailored to whether participants had not yet started, or had started but not yet completed, the survey. After fieldwork began, individuals who expressed an interest in the survey – and registered for the JPR Research Panel – were sent an invitation email and a similar sequence of reminder emails and SMS messages.

Interviews with existing members of the JPR Research Panel were expected to deliver a reasonable sample size, so additional efforts to recruit new participants were intended to compensate (as far as is possible) for panel attrition, and to increase the representation of harder to reach populations. For this survey, the main focus was given to the recruitment of younger people and those not affiliated with any synagogue. This was achieved in multiple ways. First, all respondents who completed the survey were asked to share an invitation with friends and family, particularly those who were from these harder to reach groups. Second, a small number of organisations who engage with underrepresented Jewish groups were asked to issue invitations directly to their members. Third, a limited marketing campaign was carried out with traditional print and online media outlets. Fourth, a digital marketing campaign was developed. This campaign – whose theme was ‘Make your opinions count’ – was designed to build the relationship with existing panel members and to broaden the sample. A series of images was created to accompany the survey, each highlighting a different aspect of Jewish life to appeal to different audiences. Several short videos featuring leading members of the UK Jewish community were also produced. These were promoted through the JPR website and a variety of social media channels. The social media campaign developed momentum during the course of the fieldwork. The fifth and final approach to recruitment was that JPR commissioned the support of a small number of influencers to communicate the importance of the study to young people and encourage them to take part.⁴⁸

Survey fieldwork and response rates

Fieldwork for the National Jewish Identity Survey was conducted between 16th November and 23rd December 2022, a total of 38 days,⁴⁹ and 4,907 respondents took part.⁵⁰ The number of unique households could also be estimated despite this being

48 The approach taken with NJCS was very different as the whole sample was recruited at a single point in time. Further, social media was not nearly as pervasive then as it is today, so greater reliance was made on email and more traditional media outlets. There, an estimated 55,000 emails were sent out through seed organisations, but the actual number of unique households contacted could not be determined due to the likely overlap between different organisational email lists. In addition, experience shows that the reported size of administrative databases tends to be over-estimated. Therefore, it was not possible to estimate the survey response rate.

49 This is similar to the 40 days of fieldwork for the NJCS survey, which was conducted between 6th June and 15th July 2013.

50 This is slightly higher than, but broadly equivalent to, the number of individual responses obtained during the 2013 NJCS, where the achieved sample was 4,072.

an online survey. Depending on how households are identified, the total number of unique households in the survey ranges from 2,753 to 4,345.⁵¹

Participants completed the survey online, primarily using desktops and laptops (55.1%) or smartphones and tablets (43.7%), with the remainder using other mobile devices (1.2%).⁵² Participants were provided with a study email address and freephone telephone number to call if they needed help. In a handful of cases, individuals who could not use digital technology to complete the survey requested a telephone interview, which was completed by a member of the JPR team using the standard survey software.

These 4,907 respondents can be understood in a different light by considering them as panel members. Over two-thirds of respondents (69% or n=3,366) were existing panellists, having been recruited in the first or second waves, while the remaining 31% (n=1,541) were newly recruited at this third survey wave. It is not possible to pinpoint exactly how many of these 1,541 new respondents were recruited through each of the five methods described earlier, as only about a third used specific links to enter the survey which reveal their route into it. What is clear, however, is that at least 14% (n=273) of new recruits (and, indeed of all panel members) were referred by family or friends; indeed, this is likely to significantly underrepresent the true proportion. A further 15% or more were recruited through the marketing carried out by the small number of organisations targeted for this study (n=235), 3% joined through traditional advertising (n=45) and a further 3% through six influencers (n=43). At least one third (31.3% or 480) and possibly far more (perhaps up to 42% or 650) are likely to have joined as a result of the digital marketing campaign, though more detailed data and analysis is needed to explore this more comprehensively.

Panel response rates

The panel also provides a different way of looking at survey response. At the end of survey fieldwork in December 2022, 8,010 individuals were registered for the JPR Research Panel and had been invited to take part through the survey system. It is a known feature of panel research that panellists may lose enthusiasm and 'attrit'. In this study, a total of 70.1% started the survey, and 61.0% completed the minimum required questions.⁵³

The level of panel response is slightly different for past panellists who may have contributed to several waves, and for those who were newly registered but may have found the experience of signing up burdensome. Looking first at existing panellists, a total of 5,940 of these received invitations, of whom 1.9% then opted out, 30.4% did not start the interview, and 9.3% started the interview but did not complete it. The remaining 58.5% of existing panel members completed the survey.

51 The lower figure was achieved by identifying anyone who said they were not living alone nor living in a communal establishment and asking them whether they were the person in their household with the first birthday in the calendar year. All household weights were built using this sub-group plus lone persons (n=2,753). However, the survey also captured 6-character postcodes for most respondents and an analysis of this data reveals that there were at least 4,345 unique households in the dataset, although weighting was not based on these data.

52 Interestingly, and in line with the wider literature on this topic, among those who started but did not complete the survey, the proportion who were using a smartphone or tablet was almost 10 percentage points higher (53%).

53 These figures all assume that all panellists remain eligible when, in practice, some will have died, or left the UK. This means the actual response is likely to be fractionally higher.

Turning to new panellists who registered during fieldwork for the third wave, a total of 2,070 individuals received invitations, of whom 0.7% opted out, 21.7% did not start the interview, and 8.4% started the interview but did not complete it. The remaining 69.3% of newly registered panellists completed the survey.

Interestingly, and in line with the wider literature on this topic, those who used a smartphone or tablet were considerably more likely than those who used a computer, to start but not complete the survey.

A potential benefit of the panel approach is the opportunity to look at change in attitudes or behaviours over time, known as longitudinal analysis: over half of the survey sample (53%, n=2,593) had responded to all three waves of the panel, a further 9% (n=422) took part in the first and third wave, and 7% (n=351) were recruited in the second wave and also took part in the third. This creates opportunities to extend the analysis presented in this report in the future.

How representative is the sample of the Jewish population?

At the completion of the fieldwork, the dataset was cleaned and examined for inconsistencies and ineligible responses. This resulted in 16 cases being removed from the final sample of 4,907, resulting in an analytical sample of 4,891 cases. Undoubtedly, the size of this sample is sufficiently large to support detailed analysis. An indication of the possible representativeness of the sample can be gathered by comparing the distributions of selected sociodemographic variables in this sample with census data and community statistics, specifically geography, gender, age and synagogue denomination, which are presented, in turn, below. Due to the nature of the sampling process, there is some risk of systematic sampling bias – specifically, the people who are most likely to answer a survey about Jews are people who are most interested in the topic and therefore more likely to be communally engaged than the self-identifying Jewish population as a whole. However, because of the rich sources of baseline data that are available to us and our weighting methodology, we believe that the NJIS sample is, in practice, a reasonably robust approximation, certainly for the primary purpose for which it is intended: to provide an evidence base for Jewish community leaders and policymakers.

Geographically, NJIS matches the census well: 54% of the NJIS respondents lived in London, 12% in the East of England (predominantly Hertfordshire) and 7% in the South East, giving a total of 72.9%.⁵⁴ The proportion among newly recruited survey respondents was somewhat lower, reflecting successful efforts to recruit outside London to ensure that regional populations were included in sufficient number to be more accurately represented.

⁵⁴ The equivalent figure in the 2013 NJCS was 72%.

Table 2. Comparison of regional distribution NJIS v Jewish population 2011 and 2021 Census

| | Panellists recruited pre-NJIS (unweighted) | New panellists recruited during NJIS (unweighted) | NJIS total (unweighted) | 2011 Census (E&W + Scotland) | 2021 Census (E&W only) |
|--------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|
| North East | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| North West | 10% | 9% | 10% | 11% | 12% |
| Yorkshire and The Humber | 6% | 6% | 6% | 4% | 3% |
| East Midlands | 2% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 2% |
| West Midlands | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% |
| East of England | 13% | 10% | 12% | 13% | 15% |
| London | 56% | 51% | 54% | 55% | 54% |
| South East | 7% | 8% | 7% | 7% | 7% |
| South West | 2% | 4% | 3% | 2% | 3% |
| Wales | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| Scotland [^] | 2% | 6% | 3% | 2% | N/A* |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

* 2021 Census data on religion in Scotland had not been published at the time of writing.

[^] A small number (<10) of responses from Northern Ireland are included here.

Source: Office for National Statistics.

With respect to gender, men were somewhat less likely to take part in the survey than women, as is common with social surveys. Males constitute 42.9% of the sample (n=2,104) whereas, according to the 2021 Census, the expected proportion of males at ages 16 and over is 48%.⁵⁵ Newly recruited sample members at this wave had a slightly higher representation of men, at 43.4% (n=623).

In terms of age, NJIS underrepresents younger Jews (aged 16–39) who constitute 16.5% of the sample, and the oldest age group (aged 80 and over) who constitute 8.0% of the sample. At the same time, it overrepresents mature adults (persons aged 55–74). This is a common feature of social surveys and was also observed in NJCS. A comparison of the characteristics of new and past panellists with the census figures in Table 3 shows some attrition among younger panellists in past waves (some of whom move into the next age group) but also the success of the campaign to recruit more young people for this wave, with all categories up to the age of 40 more closely matching the national composition shown in the census.

⁵⁵ The equivalent figure for the NJCS was 46%, possibly reflecting the fact that men were more likely to be the primary recipient of organisational emails, such as synagogue mailing lists.

Table 3. Age distribution of Jewish people NJIS and the 2011 and 2021 England and Wales Censuses

| | Panellists recruited pre-NJIS (unweighted) | New panellists recruited during NJIS (unweighted) | NJIS unweighted | 2011 Census | 2021 Census |
|--------------|---|--|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 16–19 | <1% | 5% | 2% | 6% | 6% |
| 20–29 | 3% | 16% | 7% | 15% | 14% |
| 30–39 | 5% | 15% | 8% | 15% | 14% |
| 40–49 | 10% | 11% | 10% | 15% | 14% |
| 50–59 | 16% | 15% | 16% | 15% | 15% |
| 60–69 | 26% | 16% | 23% | 15% | 14% |
| 70–79 | 31% | 16% | 26% | 10% | 14% |
| 80–89 | 8% | 4% | 7% | 7% | 7% |
| 90+ | 1% | 1% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Source: Census data from the Office for National Statistics.

The final weighting variable considered is Jewish denomination. Given that the JPR Research Panel initially used seed lists held by Jewish community organisations, it is reasonable to assume that those who are less communally engaged are also less likely to be represented in the sample, as is the case with most surveys of Jewish people. Indeed, if we compare the survey with synagogue membership figures which were collected through a survey of UK synagogues in 2016, there was an underrepresentation of Jews who are not affiliated⁵⁶ to a synagogue, and of strictly Orthodox Jews, and an overrepresentation of progressive Jews (Figure 92). That said, the campaign to recruit more Jews with no affiliation at this wave was particularly successful, with approximately 42% of new panellists classifying themselves in this way, closely matching the expected national composition of 44% based on community statistics. This does not fully address the underrepresentation of this unaffiliated Jews because the new cohort is only a fraction of the total achieved sample, but it shows that it is possible to achieve a more balanced sample in time, if sufficient time and resource are devoted to building and maintaining the panel.

56 The size of the unaffiliated population is calculated by subtracting the affiliated total gathered through the synagogue membership survey from the census data on the total Jewish population aged 16 and above.

Table 4. Synagogue membership distribution – synagogue survey data 2016 compared with NJIS 2022 (unweighted household data)

| | Individuals | | Households | | Unique households based on first birthday |
|-------------------|----------------------------------|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------|---|
| | 2016 synagogue membership survey | NJIS 2022 | 2016 synagogue membership survey | NJIS 2022 | |
| Central Orthodox* | 29% | 39% | 30% | 37% | |
| Liberal | 4% | 12% | 5% | 14% | |
| Masorti | 2% | 11% | 2% | 9% | |
| Reform | 10% | 22% | 11% | 24% | |
| Sephardi | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% | |
| Strictly Orthodox | 13% | 4% | 8% | 3% | |
| None | 40% | 7% | 44% | 8% | |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | |

Notes: Central Orthodox = United Synagogue, Federation of Synagogues, and 'Other Independent Orthodox'; Strictly Orthodox refers to synagogues aligned with the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations and others of a similar ethos; None is calculated by subtracting total synagogue membership from the total adult Jewish population recorded in the 2011 Census, whereas in the survey None is recorded by people saying they do not belong to a synagogue.

Source: Casale et al. 2017, op. cit. p.12.

Survey weighting

The variables presented above: age, sex, region and denomination, are gathered in all JPR surveys and allow the survey team to weight the dataset to ensure it more closely resembles the UK Jewish population. Because NJIS is housed within the JPR Research Panel, the approach to weighting the data was different from the approach taken with previous, stand-alone JPR surveys such as NJCS.


The method is based on a RIM (Random Iterative Method) weighting algorithm using the standard four variables: age, gender, region and synagogue membership. Both individual-level and household-level weights were calculated, though this report focuses mainly on the individual. RIM weighting uses the marginal distribution of each of the four key variables, rather than weighting using an interlocked grid of two or three of the variables for age, sex and region, with adjustments made for religious denomination, as JPR has done in the past. Instead, it uses a mathematical algorithm that weights the variables simultaneously and minimises the distortion of each variable. In practice, this approach builds in limits to the size of the weights applied, avoiding over-reliance on small numbers of minority groups to represent their sub-sector. However, the risk of this approach is that if there is a strong relationship between two characteristics, say living in the North East and being strictly Orthodox, then RIM weighting might not fully account for this.

In tests, we found that the RIM approach was more conservative than the interlocked grid approach. In other words, the application of RIM weights tends to adjust the data to a more limited extent than the interlocked grid approach.

However, certain aspects of RIM weighting make it more suitable for the JPR Research Panel. As well as trimming very large weights, it simplifies the process of calculating weights. Rather than relying on manual calculation for each weight, these can be computed using R. The process can therefore be replicated quickly for different achieved samples. This is important because a panel requires a number of cross-sectional and longitudinal weights, making the weighting process quite arduous. Using this approach, statistics showing the efficiency of different sets of weights are generated as part of the process. This made it possible to compare the algorithmic RIM weights with JPR's historic weights.

The effect of the weight (for individuals) is shown in Figure 92, which shows how controlling for age, sex, region and synagogue affiliation affects the distribution based on current Jewish denominational strand. For all selected indicators, the difference between unadjusted and adjusted percentages is, at most, 8 percentage points. Nevertheless, all percentages presented elsewhere in this report are based on weighted data, though all Ns are unweighted sample counts.

Figure 92. Comparison of weighted and unweighted data for distribution of current Jewish denominational strand



For reasons of comparability and consistency, the data from NJCS were reweighted to reflect the approach taken for the JPR Research Panel. Therefore, NJCS results presented in this report may differ slightly from those presented in the 2013 report. It should be noted that RIM weighting resulted in the curtailment of very large weights. In other words, the RIM sampling strategy may continue to underrepresent some groups such as the strictly Orthodox, but there is a reduced risk that the attitudes and experiences of those groups are misrepresented, should the small number of individuals who fall within any of the cross-classified groups be atypical.

Methodological conclusion

Although NJIS is based on a convenience sample, we have shown that the high quality of baseline data available to us for weighting means we can be reasonably confident that the weighted results are statistically robust representations of the adult Jewish population of the UK.

In general, like NJCS, the NJIS sample reflects the diverse character of Jews in Britain across a wide variety of social, religious and demographic variables. Where the sample departs from baseline characteristics, weighting (for age, sex, region and synagogue membership) has been applied. Consequently, all percentages presented in this report are based on weighted data and are accompanied by an unweighted sample count (or N,) which indicates how confident the reader can be that the findings are based on a sample of reasonable size.

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